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COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE? TWO AUDIENCES,
TWO ANSWERS
Carol S. Steiker*
"You'd be better informed if instead of listening to what we say, you
watch what we do." 1

I.

!NTRODUCTION: COUNTER-REVOLUTION?

When Richard M. Nixon ran for president in 1968, he campaigned
on a now-familiar "law and order" platform. Among other things, he
pledged to appoint Justices to the Supreme Court who would combat
the Warren Court's controversial constitutional decisions limiting the
power of law enforcement officials to investigate and prosecute crime.
When Nixon won the presidency and then almost immediately had the
opportunity to replace Chief Justice Earl Warren and three Associate
Justices with appointees of his own, it was widely predicted that the
major innovations of the Warren Court in constitutional criminal procedure - any list would include Mapp, 2 Massiah,3 and Miranda 4 would not long survive. In the almost thirty years since Nixon's victory,
the Supreme Court's pulse-takers have offered periodic updates on the
fate of the Warren Court's criminal procedure "revolution" in the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts.

* Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. B.A. 1982, Harvard-Radcliffe Colleges; J.D. 1986, Harvard Law School. - Ed. I thank Stephen Schulhofer, L. Michael
Seidman, Jordan Steiker, and William Stuntz for helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this article, participants in Harvard Law School's Summer Research Program and the
Federalist Society Symposium on Justice and the Criminal Justice Process at Stanford
Law School for reactions to preliminary presentations of this work, and Hartley Kuhn,
Richard Moberly, and Jessica Roth for excellent research assistance.
1. This was Attorney General John N. Mitchell's famous response to criticism of
the Nixon Administration's record on civil rights. "Watch What We Do," WASH. PosT,
July 7, 1969, at A22.
2. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states).
3. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (holding that the ~ixth Amendment precludes the use of incriminating statements deliberately elicited by law enforcement agents after a defendant's indictment in the absence of counsel).
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires warnings to suspects preceding any custodial interrogation).
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The voluminous body of literature formed by these assessments5
presents something of a puzzle. The unanimity of projection about the
future of the Warren Court's criminal procedure soon gave way to widespread disagreement about the nature and extent of the response of the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts. On the one hand, many commentators usually admirers of the Warren court's handiwork - have lamented
over the years about what they view as a wholesale repudiation of the
Warren Court's work; their comments are full of words like "retreat," 6
"decline," 7 and "counter-revolution." 8 At the very same time, other
commentators - many of them also defenders of the Warren Court have maintained that these laments are "overstated," 9 and "considerably exaggerated" 10 and that the basic structure of the Warren Court's
criminal procedure jurisprudence is firmly "entrenched." 11 As one critic
of the Warren Court recently has bemoaned, "The voice that continues
5. It is fitting to note in this issue of the Michigan Law Review full of tributes to
Jerold Israel that one of the seminal pieces of this literature is Jerold H. Israel, Criminal
Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 15 MICH. L. REv.
1319 (1977). Other important contributions to this debate in chronological order are:
Edward Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual, and the Criminal Process: Directions
and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 518 (1977); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Foreword: The
Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts,
69 GEO. LJ. 151 (1980); Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court:
An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv.
436 (1980); Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983); Yale Kamisar,
The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really
So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER
COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT w ASN'T 62 (Vmcent Blasi ed., 1983);
Charles H. Whitebread, The Burger Court's Counter-Revolution in Criminal Procedure:
The Recent Criminal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 24 WASHBURN
L.J. 471 (1985); Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the Rehnquist Court: Has the
Rehnquisition Begun?, 62 IND. L.J. 273 (1987); Joseph D. Grano, Introduction -The
Changed and Changing World of Constitutional Criminal Procedure: The Contribution
of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Policy, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 395
(1989); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
591 (1990); Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1369 (1991); David J. Bodenhamer, Reversing the Revolution:
Rights of the Accused in a Conservative Age, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN
AMERICA: AFrER 200 YEARS 101 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds.,
1993); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1 (1995).
6. Chase, supra note 5, at 595.
7. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 15 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1990).
8. Whitebread, supra note 5, at 498.
9. Israel, supra note 5, at 1324.
10. Kamisar, supra note 5, at 68.
11. Saltzburg, supra note 5, at 208.
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to urge repentance [from the Warren Court's criminal procedure] today
is truly '[t]he voice of him that crieth in the wilderness.' " 12
One could attempt to resolve (or repudiate) this puzzling conflict
in a variety of ways. One could, for example, attempt to explain disagreement about the nature of change by distinguishing between levels
of abstraction - between "doctrinal" and "ideological" change.13 Or
one could note that the difficulties inherent in weighing and measuring
any sort of jurisprudential shift are exacerbated greatly in the broad, diffuse, and fact-specific jungle that is constitutional criminal procedure.
Or one could ascribe the debate to a dispute over semantics: just how
much change, after all, is "revolutionary" or "counter-revolutionary"?
Or one simply could write off the more extreme statements on either
side of the divide as rhetorical flourishes offered in the spirit of academic "spin control.''
I, however, want to resist these temptations to downplay or deny
the conflict, because I believe that the debate over continuity and
change in constitutional criminal procedure can best be accounted for in
an entirely different way - a way that suggests a new kind of critique
of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' criminal procedure jurisprudence. I
start with the contention that the Supreme Court has profoundly
changed its approach to constitutional criminal procedure since the
1960s at least in the following fairly limited (but obviously important)
sense: the Court has clearly become less sympathetic to claims of individual rights and more accommodating to assertions of the need for
public order. In the last three decades, the Court has granted review to
and found in favor of criminal defendants much less frequently than it
did in the heyday of the Warren Court. 14 Thus, at least in Holmes' posi-

12. Grano, supra note 5, at 400 (quoting Isaiah 40:3).
13. For example, Michael Seidman contends that, as a matter of ideology, the Burger Court was making social policy choices in exactly the same way the Warren Court
had been doing, while hiding behind an illusorily purist "guilt and innocence" model of
criminal procedure. See Seidman, supra note 5, at 445-46. Peter Arenella takes issue
with Seidman and finds significant divergence in the ideologies of the Warren and Burger Courts by resurrecting Herbert Packer's "due process" and "crime control" models
of criminal procedure. See Arenella, supra note 5, at 209. In other words, Seidman acknowledges doctrinal change but argues for ideological continuity, whereas Arenella acknowledges doctrinal continuity but argues for ideological change.
14. Liva Baker writes:
In the mid-sixties ... more than 90 percent of the Court's criminal docket
was made up of cases brought by defendants who had lost in tl}e lower courts,
less than 10 percent brought by prosecutors, and at least one assistant in the office of Solicitor General Marshall that year "viewed it as either futile or foolhardy" to pursue to the Supreme Court a case which the government had lost in
a lower court ....
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tivist sense of law as a prediction of what courts will do in fact, the law
has changed radically. is
The way in which this change has occurred, however, may help
explain the academic divide. My contention is that much of this change
has occurred quite differently from what was predicted at the close of
the Warren Court era. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have not altered radically - and indeed, occasionally have bolstered - the
Warren Court's constitutional norms regarding police practices. The edifice constructed by the Warren Court governing investigative techniques
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments remains surprisingly intact. Rather than redrawing in any drastic fashion the line between constitutional and unconstitutional police conduct, the Supreme Court has
revolutionized the consequences of deeming conduct unconstitutional.
This revolution has not taken the form of wholesale abolition of the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, or the Fifth or Sixth Amendments' mandates of exclusion; rather, the Court has proliferated a variety of what I would term "inclusionary rules" - rules that permit the
use at trial of admittedly unconstitutionally obtained evidence or that let
stand criminal convictions based on such evidence. Examples of "inclusionary rules" are the doctrines regarding standing, the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement, the "fruit of the poisonous tree," 16
impeachment, harmless error, and limitations on federal habeas review
of criminal convictions.
Thus, for the purposes of my argument, I adapt Professor Meir
Dan-Cohen's distinction (which he in turn borrowed from Jeremy Bentham)17 between "conduct" rules and "decision" rules. Bentham and
Dan-Cohen make this distinction in the context of substantive criminal
By the mid-seventies, however, the proportion of cases brought by criminal
defendants which the Court agreed to hear had dropped below 25 percent, the
prosecutor's share had risen above 75 percent, and prosecutors ... were filing
three times as many criminal appeals ....
LIVA BAKER, M!RANDA: CRIME, LAW AND PoLmcs 352 (1983).
15. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L.
R.Ev. 457, 461 (1897).
16. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-88 (1963) (using the
"fruit" metaphor to describe the mode of analysis for determining when the connection
between illegal police conduct and recovered evidence is sufficiently attenuated to permit the use of the evidence at trial) (citing Justice Frankfurter's famous opinion in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
17. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. R.Ev. 625, 626 (1984) (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM,
A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 430 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd.
1948) (1776 & 1789)).
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law; for their purposes, "conduct" rules are addressed to the general
public in order to guide its behavior (for example, "Let no person
steal") and "decision" rules are addressed to public officials in order to
guide their decisionmaking about the consequences of violating conduct
rules (for example, "Let the judge cause whoever is convicted of stealing to be hanged"). But as any teacher of both substantive and procedural criminal law knows, constitutional criminal procedure is a species of
substantive criminal law for cops. Thus, for my purposes, "conduct"
rules (my "constitutional norms") are addressed to law enforcement
agents regarding the constitutional legitimacy of their investigative
practices and "decision" rules (my "inclusionary rules") are addressed
to courts regarding the consequences of unconstitutional conduct.
My primary descriptive claim, elaborated in Parts II and ill, is that
the Supreme Court's shift in constitutional criminal procedure from the
1960s to the 1990s has occasioned much more dramatic changes in decision rules than in conduct rules. I illustrate this claim by comparing
the relative stability of constitutional norms regarding police practices
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the profusion of significant inclusionary rules affecting these same areas. This claim is
qualitative rather than quantitative, and comparative rather than absolute. I do not mean to say that the Supreme Court has deployed decision
rules more than conduct rules in any strict numerical sense, nor do I
contend that constitutional norms have not shifted at all; rather, I argue
that the Court's decision-rule cases have diverged far more from the
Warren Court's starting point than have its conduct-rule cases. Thus, the
dichotomy between decision rules and conduct rules helps to explain
the existence of such a deep academic divide. The proponents and debunkers of the "counter-revolution" hypothesis turn out to both be
right: the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have accepted to a significant
extent the Warren Court's definitions of constitutional "rights" while
waging counter-revolutionary war against the Warren Court's constitutional "remedies" of evidentiary exclusion and its federal review and
reversal of convictions.
This primary descriptive claim, if accepted, leads to a secondary
descriptive claim, which I explain in Part IV. Professor Dan-Cohen
used the distinction between conduct rules and decision rules to illustrate the concept of what he termed "acoustic separation." Certain areas
of substantive criminal law, observed Dan-Cohen, reflect such divergence between the decision rules courts use to enforce the law and the
conduct rules announced to the general public, that it is as if the decision-makers and the members of the public are in separate, sound-proof

Counter-Revolution?
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rooms, unable to hear the rules announced to each other. 18 I argue that
the transformation of decision rules in constitutional criminal procedure
creates a similar sort of "acoustic separation" between the law enforcement community and the general public. The law enforcement community, through training and on-the-job experience, has direct access to the
decision rules used by courts. The general public, which receives its information largely through the media, has much greater access to conduct rules governing police behavior (i.e., the public's "constitutional
rights") than to decision rules in criminal procedure cases as they are
implemented by courts (i.e., which violations of constitutional rights actually result in a court-imposed sanction).
·
This second descdptive claim leads to a normative question, which
I raise in Part V: should we worry or even care about the relative sophistication or naivete of the police and the people regarding the Supreme Court's constitutional criminal procedure? I think we should both
care and worry. The law enforcement community's easy access to decision rules should create concerns that sophisticated law enforcement
agents will see some incentives to violate conduct rules when no courtimposed sanction will follow. And the public's lack of access to decision rules should cause us to worry that the public overestimates the
court-imposed constraints on law enforcement. Some available empirical data about the attitudes of law enforcement agents and the public
lend credence to these fears and suggest avenues for future data collection. I conclude that the public's overly sanguine picture of the role of
the courts in constraining police power may be one factor, among
many, that leads Americans to place more and more public trust and
money in the institutions of law enforcement and the criminal justice
system to solve our most pressing social problems.
Il.

RELATIVE CONSTANCY IN CONDUCT RULES

The Warren Court established and embellished conduct rules governing police practices under three main constitutional rubrics: the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures,
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimination,
and the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel in all
criminal cases. It is easy to identify the chief innovation of the Warren
Court in the Fifth Amendment area: Miranda v. Arizona19 required a
completely new set of procedures for the interrogation of suspects in
the custody of law enforcement agents. The Warren Court's Sixth
18. See id. at 630-34.
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Amendment norms of police conduct likewise derive from a single
case: Massiah v. United States20 drastically curtailed law enforcement
contact with defendants for investigatory purposes after the commencement of adversary proceedings. It is a bit harder to identify in any neat
and simple way the germ of the Warren Court's Fourth Amendment
norms. Mapp v. Ohio21 extended the exclusionary rule to the states by
incorporating it through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but it did not purport to change in any way the conduct
rules establishing which searches and seizures are constitutionally "unreasonable." Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some core Fourth
Amendment norms of the Warren Court, and I do so below. In each of
these constitutional arenas, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have left
substantially intact (and sometimes even have reinforced or expanded)
the edifice of norms constructed by the Warren Court. To the extent that
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts retreated from the Warren Court's normative constitutional commitments, these retreats generally were either
strongly foreshadowed by the Warren Court's own work or dwarfed by
much more dramatic changes in decision rules.
A.

Sixth Amendment: Massiah

The strongest example of constancy in conduct rules is the continuity of the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence over
time. The Sixth Amendment contains a large number of discrete provisions, united by their apparent relationship to the conduct of criminal
trials. 22 Yet in the Massiah case, the Warren Court revolutionized that
understanding of the amendment by holding that the provision guaranteeing "assistance of counsel" in "criminal prosecutions" extended not
only to assuring the competent service of counsel at the trial or related
judicial proceedings, but also to restraining the conduct of law enforcement agents on the streets.23

20. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22. The Sixth Amendment reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
23. Hence, when I refer to the Court's "Sixth Amendment jurisprudence" for the
purposes of this paper, I mean its cases relating to police practices - Massiah and its
progeny - all of which fall under the "assistance to counsel" rubric.
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In Massiah, a federa1 agent had obtained, without Massiah's
knowledge, the agreement of one of Massiah's co-defendants to engage
Massiah in conversation about the narcotics charges they were jointly
facing while the agent listened by way of a radio transmitter insta1led
under the front seat of the co-defendant's car. Massiah had a1ready been
formally charged and had retained a lawyer to represent him; he was
free on bail at the time of the conversation at issue. The Court held that
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel was violated
whenever the government "deliberately elicited" 24 incriminating statements from a criminal defendant "after he had been indicted and in the
absence of his counsel" 25 and sought to use such statements as evidence
against him at trial. 26
In essence, the Massiah decision created a privilege against the use
of any incriminating testimony intentionally procured by the government from the defendant after the formal charging decision, absent an
explicit waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which the
Court later made fairly difficult to obtain.27 Massiah thus represents a
substantial, even dramatic extension of restrictions on police conduct,
reaching law enforcement practices that otherwise were condoned under
the Fourth or Fifth Amendments, even as construed by the Warren
Court. Under the Fourth Amendment, the Court held that the elicitation
of incriminating statements from a suspect by the government through
the use of informants violated no reasonable expectation of privacy of
the suspect because the suspect was not entitled to rely upon his "misplaced confidence" that his friends and associates would not "reveal
his wrongdoing. " 28 But Massiah essentially precludes the use of informants to elicit incriminating statements from defendants after the for24. 377 U.S. at 206.
25. 377 U.S. at 206.
26. See 377 U.S. at 205-06. The Massiah right, as well as the Miranda right, are
explicitly rights not to have evidence admitted at trial, rather than rights to be free from
any particular form of treatment. They thus represent a challenge to my attempt to divide criminal procedure into conduct rules and decision rules. I call Massiah and Miranda conduct rules, but they both include as a necessary part of the prohibited conduct
a court's decision to admit evidence at trial. Presumably, police conduct in violation of
these rules, without the admission at trial of the offending evidence, would not itself violate the Constitution. (At least, it would not violate the Sixth or Fifth Amendments; it
might still violate the Due Process Clause). I attempt, nonetheless, to maintain my distinction. Because the vast majority of police behavior that violates Massiah and Miranda is motivated solely or primarily by the desire to obtain evidence to admit at criminal trials, it makes sense to view the rules as rules of general conduct. And, indeed,
both courts and the police themselves have tended to view Massiah and Miranda in just
this way - as a code of constitutionally mandated police conduct.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 41-52.
28. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
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mal charging decision. Under the Fifth Amendment, the Court held that
special waivers of the Fifth Amendment's rights to silence and counsel
needed to be obtained only if a suspect was subject to the "inherently
compelling' pressures" of interrogation while in police custody.29 Yet
Massiah applies to all elicitation of incriminating statements postindictment, whether or not the defendant is in custody, and whether or
not the government's actions constitute "interrogation" for the purposes
of Miranda. Finally, under the Fifth Amendment, the test for the admissibility of incriminating statements elicited outside of the custodial interrogation context remained the old "voluntariness" standard,30
whereas Massiah prohibits the use of statements deliberately elicited
from an indicted defendant, even when, as in Massiah 's own case, it
was apparent that they were made voluntarily. The significance of the
effect of the Massiah rule on government investigatory practices was
reflected at the time in the vehemence of the arguments made on behalf
of the federal government before the Massiah Court31 and continues to
be reflected a bit more indirectly today in the ongoing controversy
about whether or not federal prosecutors should be subject to state ethical rules barring communications with represented defendants in the absence of their counsel.32
In light of both the significance of the Massiah ruling to federal
and state criminal investigations33 and the ruling's demonstration of the
Warren Court's notorious penchant for novel, categorical, and sweeping
29. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
30. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323-24 (1959) (asking whether the suspect's will was overborne in light of the totality of the circumstances).
31. See Brief for the United States at 26-28, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964) (No. 63-199).
32. This controversy deals with former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh's attempt to exempt federal prosecutors altogether from the ubiquitous state ethical rules
barring contact with persons represented by counsel. The ethical "no contact" rule differs from the Massiah rule in that it is obviously nonconstitutional in origin, applies
only to the conduct of lawyers as opposed to law enforcement agents, applies to civil
and criminal cases alike, does not turn on whether or not the represented person is
"charged" with a crime, and is enforced primarily by disciplinary proceedings as opposed to exclusion of evidence at trial. Yet the government's concerns that state "no
contact" rules will interfere unduly with its investigatory activities, see F. Dennis
Saylor, IV & J. Douglas Wilson, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Application of Model Rule 4.2 to Federal Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 459 (1992), echo
many of the concerns voiced by the Solicitor General in Massiah itself. See generally
Symposium, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 271 (1992) (discussing state ethics rules and federal
prosecutors); Alafair S.R. Burke, Note, Reconciling Professional Ethics and
Prosecutorial Power: The No-Contact Rule Debate, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1635 (1994).
33. One year prior to the Massiah decision, the Court had incorporated the Sixth
Amendment right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). One year after Massiah, the Court summarily reversed a
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rules in the constitutional criminal procedure area, it is truly remarkable
that the rule not only survived, but flourished in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. While the Warren Court followed Massiah by enforcing it
through summary disposition,34 the Burger Court was silent for some
time on the merits of Massiah, neither "following" nor "limiting" (nor
even "explaining" or "questioning") the ruling, at least according to
Shepard's use of those terms.35 Then, in 1977, the Burger Court in
Brewer v. Williams, 36 dramatically and emphatically reaffirmed the
Massiah rule, holding inadmissible the incriminating statements of the
murderer of a IO-year-old girl because the defendant had been induced
to reveal the location of the body of his young victim by the famous
"Christian burial speech" given by a police detective during a long car
ride after the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had
attached.37
The Williams decision is notable for my purpose of demonstrating
constancy in police conduct rules in a number of ways. Perhaps most
strikingly, the Supreme Court not only reaffirmed Massiah, it rejected
the urging of twenty-one state Attorneys General to overrule Miranda. 38
Given that the lower court had ruled for Williams on both Sixth and
Fifth Amendment grounds, it is not surprising that "many observers
thought the Court might take the occasion to overrule the controversial
Miranda doctrine. " 39 Yet Miranda's conduct rule survived unscathed.40
Moreover, Massiah's rule was revitalized - not only reaffirmed, but
actually strengthened in at least three significant ways.
First, Williams established a fairly high standard for the waiver of
the Massiah right to counsel. The Massiah Court had not dealt with the
state court decision attempting to distinguish and evade the Massiah rule. See McLeod
v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam).
34. See McLeod, 381 U.S. at 356.
35. See SHEPARD'S FEDERAL CITATIONS inside cover (8th ed. 1995). Scholars
agree that the fate of Massiah was very much an open question until 1977. See, e.g.,
WAYNER. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 6.4(d), at 305
(2d ed. 1992) (arguing that the status of the Massiah holding was "uncertain" until
"the Supreme Court breathed new life into [it]" in the Williams case); YALE KAMISAR,
POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: EsSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 160
(1980) ("Until the Christian burial speech case [Williams] was decided a year ago, lasting fame had eluded Massiah . . . .").
36. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
37. 430 U.S. at 392-93, 404-06.
38. An organization called Americans for Effective Law Enforcement and 21 state
Attorneys General joined in an amicus brief in Brewer v. Williams urging the reconsideration and rejection of Miranda. See 430 U.S. at 389.
39. Phillip E. Johnson, The Return of the "Christian Burial Speech" Case, 32 EMORY LJ. 349, 352 (1983).
40. See infra section 11.B.
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issue of whether and how the new Six.th Amendment right it conferred
could be waived, because that issue is simply not presented when a
defendant does not even realize that he is dealing with a government
agent. But in Williams, the defendant knew that he was dealing with the
police, and his capitulation to the subtle entreaties of the detective led
the government to claim that Williams had waived any right to counsel
that he may have had. Accepting the possibility that a defendant may
waive the Six.th Amendment right to counsel without initially having
counsel present (as the Court had already accepted in the Fifth Amendment right to counsel context41), the Williams Court nonetheless invoked
the Johnson v. Zerbst42 waiver standard, which required the government
to prove "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right. " 43 This standard requires at a minimum some form of notice to
the defendant of his right to have counsel present. While the Zerbst
standard was a familiar one by 1977, only four years earlier in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 44 the Court had used a less rigorous "voluntariness" standard to determine whether defendants had consented to a
search by police officers, thus effectively "waiving" their Fourth
Amendment rights. Applying this lower standard, the Bustamonte Court
held that defendants need not be informed by the police of their right to
refuse consent in order for their consent to a search to be deemed voluntary. In justifying its use of a lower standard, the Court distinguished
Fourth Amendment rights, which protect privacy at the cost of truth,
from "trial" rights - such as the right to assistance of counsel which promote truth-seeking by ensuring fair judicial proceedings.45 Yet
the Massiah rule transported the traditional "trial" right to counsel
from the courtroom to - in the Williams case - the backseat of a police car. Thus, it is notable that despite the apparently investigative aspect of the police conduct in Williams, the Court continued to apply the
high waiver standard reserved for "trial" rights.46
41. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The Court later held that
the warnings sufficient to permit waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel i.e., the Miranda warnings - were also sufficient to permit waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the same time. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
Thus, a defendant in custody whose Sixth Amendment right to counsel already had attached could be read Miranda warnings and, if the undefined "right to have counsel
present" was waived, could be interrogated in accordance with both the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.
42. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
43. 304 U.S. at 464.
44. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
45. See 412 U.S. at 241.
46. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 157-58
(1993) (arguing that the Massiah rule is not a proper interpretation of the Sixth Amend-
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The Burger Court later established an even stricter standard for establishing a valid waiver after a defendant actually had invoked the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In Michigan v. Jackson41 the Court
held that when a defendant entitled to representation by counsel invoked that right, any later waiver of the right was invalid if it was the
product of police-initiated interrogation. In essence, the Court imported
the Edwards v. Arizona48 bright-line rule from the Miranda invocation
and waiver context. 49 Yet the Edwards rule worked even more
powerfully in the Sixth Amendment context: the Court held that if a
defendant asserted the right to counsel at arraignment, such an invocation triggered the no-initiation rule regardless of the fact that the request
for counsel was general and not targeted specifically to police interrogation,s0 and regardless of the fact that the police might be ignorant of the
fact that the defendant had asserted the right in court.st The only limitation that the Court imposed on the broad sweep of this powerful prophylactic rule is that the invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is "offense specific," so that if a defendant at an arraignment
invoked the right to counsel as to those charges, the police still could
initiate questioning in the absence of counsel about unrelated charges
about which the right to counsel had neither attached nor been invoked
at the time.s2
Second, the Williams decision established a fairly broad definition
of what constitutes "deliberate elicitation" of incriminating statements.
After all, Detective Leaming had been careful not to ask Williams any
direct questions about the location of the victim's body. Instead, he began the "Christian burial speech" with the vague injunction: "I want to
give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road
. . . ." When Williams responded to the Detective's suggestion that
"this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial" with a question,
Leaming then said, "I do not want you to answer me. I don't want to
discuss it any further. Just think about it as we're riding down the

ment right to counsel because it is unrelated to that provision's historical goal of promoting truth-seeking).
47. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
48. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 84-88.
50. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 633 (holding that a defendant's invocation of the
right to counsel at arraignment should lead courtS to "presume that the defendant requests the lawyer's services at every critical stage of the prosecution").
51. See 475 U.S. at 634 (holding that "[o]ne set of state actors {the police) may
not claim ignorance of defendants' unequivocal request for counsel to another state actor {the court)").
52. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
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road. " 53 The Court could have narrowed the meaning of "deliberate
elicitation" to some form of direct questioning (whether by an informant, as in Massiah, or by a known law enforcement agent), but it chose
instead to recognize that an experienced detective like Leaming had
means at his disposal to elicit incriminating statements "just as surely
as - and perhaps more effectively than - if he had formally interrogated [Williams]. " 54 Williams not only set a generous standard for Sixth
Amendment "elicitation," but its loose equation of Detective Learning's
tactics with "interrogation" 55 also set the stage for a fairly broad definition of interrogation for the purposes of the Miranda Fifth Amendment
right to counsel (and silence).56
Finally, the Williams Court made clear that it was not merely indictment, as in the Massiah case, that signalled the need for counsel
when law enforcement agents sought to elicit incriminating statements
from a defendant. Rather, the fact that Williams had been arraigned
before a judicial officer sufficed to indica~e that "judicial proceedings
had been initiated against [him]. " 57 The Court later solidified and expanded this holding in two ways. First, the Court made clear that it was
not necessary for the defendant to enter a plea at an arraignment
(thereby rendering the arraignment a "critical stage" in the judicial process requiring the presence of counsel) for the arraignment to count as
the initiation of judicial proceedings.58 Second, the Court established
that arraignment or formal charging of the defendant gave rise to the
right to counsel regardless of whether the defendant was in fact repre-

53. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 392-93 (1977).
54. 430 U.S. at 399. The Court later reaffinned, in the jailhouse infonnant context,
that deliberate elicitation did not require actual interrogation. In United States v. Henry,
447 U.S. 264 (1980), the use of a paid infonnant who engaged in conversations with
the incarcerated defendant was held to violate the Sixth Amendment even though the
infonnant had been instructed "not to initiate any conversation with or question" the
defendant 447 U.S. at 266. In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986), the Court
backtracked from the broadest possible reading of Henry by clarifying that an infonnant
could, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, act as a mere "listening post." 477 U.S. at
456 n.19 (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 177 n.13 (1985)). But once again,
the Court reiterated that the Massiah rule covered not only direct questioning but also
"secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police
interrogation." 477 U.S. at 459.
55. See Williams, 430 U.S. at 399.
56. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), discussed infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
57. Williams, 430 U.S. at 399.
58. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). Some states have an arraignment procedure that constitutes merely the defendant's first appearance before a judicial
officer rather than a fonnal pleading stage.
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sented by appointed or retained counsel at the time the government
sought to elicit incriminating statements.59
In sum, if one were to look only at the treatment of the Sixth
Amendment police conduct rules established by the Warren Court in the
hands of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, one could not possibly conclude that any sort of "counter-revolution" occurred. Indeed, it would
be only fair to acknowledge that the later Courts actually have strengthened Massiah, rendering its dictates both clearer and more potent today
than they were in 1964.
B. Fifth Amendment: Miranda
The later Courts' treatment of Miranda - the Warren Court's primary contribution to police conduct rules in the Fifth Amendment context - is less starkly positive than l;heir treatment of Massiah. Yet
given the vociferous outcry against Miranda, 60 which was clearly the
most notorious (to detractors) of the Warren Court's criminal decisions,
Miranda's basic requirements - that police administer set warnings
and obtain valid waivers before statements obtained as a result of custodial interrogation may be admitted - have remained largely, even surprisingly, unaltered. Not only did the Burger and Rehnquist Courts decline opportunities to overrule Miranda outright, but they also
elaborated on the major components of the Miranda conduct rules in
ways that often stabilized and sometimes even strengthened Miranda's
restraints on custodial interrogation of suspects. In particular, the elaborations of the meaning of "custody" and "interrogation" and the rules
for obtaining valid waivers after the invocation of Miranda rights illustrate significant stability in the Miranda regime. And the decisions that
have created exceptions to the broad reach of Miranda's conduct rules,
while not insignificant, do not come close to outweighing either the relative stability in the rest of the doctrine or the significance of the
changes in decision rules, which I discuss in Part ill.

59. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (citing McLeod v. Ohio, 381
U.S. 356 (1965)~.
60. See BAKER, supra note 14, at 170, 201 (describing in detail the "uproar" that
resulted from the Miranda decision and the "tirades" against it). Perhaps the most telling expression of hostility to Miranda came in Congress's purported "overruling" of
the decision in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501-3501(b) (1994), which required the admission into evidence inJederal courts of
all voluntar}' confessions and re-instituted the pre-Miranda totality of the circumstances
approach to the issue of voluntariness. This legislation remains on the books, although
it has not been relied upon by the federal government, and thus its constitutionality has
not been ruled upon by the federal courts.
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First, in light of the intense opposition that it inspired, it is notable
simply that Miranda was not overruled directly. 61 As remarked above,
the Court ignored the plea of almost half of the nation's state Attorneys
General to do so in 1977.62 And in the years that followed, two of the
"conservative" appointees to the Court expressly noted their opposition
to overruling Miranda. 63 But perhaps it is not so surprising that the
Court was reluctant to overrule Miranda directly despite its apparent
disagreement with the decision: 64 either the members of the Court sincerely felt bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, or they more calculatingly realized that overruling such a well-known decision might appear
to be "political" in exactly the way in which the Warren Court was
maligned for being.65 What is surprising is the extent to which the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, despite opportunities to limit Miranda without overruling it directly, left relatively intact Miranda's requirements
as rules of conduct for police officers.
Two significant opportunities to cut back on Miranda came in the
inevitable cases requiring the Court to give further content to the idea
of "custodial interrogation." 66 Yet the Court's later construction of the
bounds of "custody" and "interrogation" for the purposes of Miranda
was fairly generous. In Miranda itself, Chief Justice Warren had defined "custody" for the Court as being "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of . . . freedom of action in any significant way. " 67 The
Warren Court had gone on to conclude that a suspect could be in "custody" for Miranda purposes while serving a prison sentence for an

61. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REv. 673, 719
(1992) ("[T]he failure of Miranda's opponents to overturn a five-to-four decision that
has always been unpopular borders on the miraculous.").
62. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
63. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("Miranda is now the law . . . . ");Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, CJ., concurring) ("I would neither overrule
Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date.").
64. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP.
Cr. REv. 99, 99 (noting that the majority of the members of the Burger Court apparently believed Miranda "to be seriously misguided or worse").
65. See David Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in THE PoLmCS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE II, 15 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (arguing that the Court's "decision not
to overrule is based on the likely public perception of and reaction to such a decision
and the effect on the Court's power and legitimacy").
66. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 545 (1966) (White, J., dissenting)
("Today's decision leaves open such questions as whether the accused was in custody
. . . [and] whether his statements were spontaneous or the product of interrogation

....").

67. 384 U.S. at 444.
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offense different from the one he was questioned about, 68 or even while
he remained in his own home (indeed, his own bedroom), if surrounded
by police officers.69 Although in a later case the Burger Court found
that a suspect questioned in his home was not in custody under the particular facts of that case,70 the Court soon thereafter cited the two Warren Court custody decisions approvingly, 71 and it has not to this day
questioned or overruled them. While the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
have established that mere presence in a police station does not constitute custody if it is voluntary,72 and that "traffic stops" of motorists
generally do not constitute custody,73 both of these cases purported to
construe rather than to displace the "significant deprivation of freedom" standard articulated in Miranda itself. Most significantly, the
Burger Court established that this standard was to be determined from
the point of view of a reasonable person in the suspect's position,14 thus
rendering irrelevant easily fabricated and virtually undisprovable testimony from police officers about their (benign) perceptions of the situation or intentions toward the suspect. The Rehnquist Court, too, has validated and enforced vigorously this "objective suspect" standard.75
The elaboration of the standard for "interrogation" has been, if
anything, more generous. In Rhode Island v. Innis16 the Court took the
important step of rejecting an easy way to cut out the heart of the concept of "interrogation" when it held that interrogation was not limited
to express questioning of a suspect but also encompassed "any words
or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the sus-

68. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
69. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
70. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (holding that the mere fact
that the I.R.S. 's criminal investigation had "focused" on the defendant was insufficient
to render an interview in his home "custodial" for the purpose of Miranda).
71. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977) (per curiam).
72. See 429 U.S. at 492. Although the Mathiason decision did little to change the
governing standard for custody, its application of that standard to the defendant, a parolee "invited" to the police station and told of strong (albeit false) evidence against
him, seems somewhat dubious. It is questionable whether Mathiason would be decided
the same way today, now that the Court has clarified that the correct standard views the
situation from the perspective of a person in the defendant's shoes.
73. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
74. See 468 U.S. at 442.
75. See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1526 (1994) (per curiam) (reversing and remanding because the state court's determination that the defendant was not in
custody relied in part on the testimony of police officers as to their subjective impressions, and citing numerous other Supreme Court cases rejecting such subjective
testimony).
76. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
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pect. " 77 This definition of interrogation often will preclude the police
from evading the Miranda requirements by engaging in powerful psychological ploys to elicit incriminating statements without questioning
suspects directly - such as by confronting a suspect with physical evidence (real or fabricated); confronting a suspect with an accomplice's
confession (real or fabricated); staging a (real or fabricated) identification of the defendant; or musing out loud, perhaps to another officer,
about the (real or fabricated) strength of the government's case or the
likely fate of the defendant.78 The Court's application of this standard in
Innis itself seems rather dubious,79 but the standard itself reflects an important acceptance of one of Miranda's central insights - that psychological ploys lay at the center of the "inherent compulsion" of the custodial atmosphere.80
'The strongest support for Miranda's conduct rules in the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts is apparent in the cases exploring whether and
how police may obtain valid waivers after a suspect initially has invoked the rights to silence or counsel pursuant to Miranda. The most
draconian rule, of course, would have precluded any waiver after invocation in any circumstances. Such a rule, however, would allow for no
77. 446 U.S. at 301 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court expressly noted that
the "reasonably likely to elicit" standard for Miranda interrogation was not exactly the
same as the "deliberately elicit" standard for Massiah interrogation, see infra text accompanying notes 53-56, but it seems likely that the generous Massiah standard established in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), influenced the Court's decision in
Innis three years later.
78. Although these strategies are now generally considered "interrogation" so as
to require the administration of Miranda warnings and a waiver of Miranda rights by a
suspect in custody, it is important to note that the post-Warren Court has found nothing
wrong with the use of deceptive interrogation tactics (such as falsely characterizing the
evidence against a suspect) as long as they are "laundered" through the Miranda process. In no case has the Burger or Rehnquist Court found a confession or a waiver of
rights to be "involuntary" as a result of such deceptive techniques. While this tolerance
might be viewed as an important limit on Miranda as a conduct rule, it was strongly
foreshadowed by a decision of the Warren Court itself holding that when an interrogating officer falsely told a suspect that his co-defendant had already confessed, such a
misrepresentation did not render the suspect's ensuing statements involuntary. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
79. The Court found no interrogation despite a colloquy among several officers in
the presence of a suspect who was being transported to the stationhouse about the likelihood that a child at a nearby school for handicapped children might stumble upon the
shotgun that the offic,ers suspected the suspect had hidden in area (and despite the fact
that the suspect then led the officers to the gun). See Innis, 446 U.S. at 291.
80. Yale Kamisar, too, has argued that the Innis Court's generous standard is more
important than its dubious application, asserting that "in Miranda's hour of peril, the
Innis Court rose to its defense." Yale Kamisar, Miranda: The Case, the Man, and the
Players, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1074, 1088 (1984) (reviewing LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA:
CRIME, LAW AND PoLmCS (1983)).
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possibility that a suspect ever could change his or her mind. The Court
did not go quite so far, but it nonetheless erected substantial barriers to
obtaining waivers after invocation - barriers that prevented the
Miranda requirements from slipping back toward the old flexible-butindeterminate "voluntariness" standard.
The Burger Court declined its biggest opportunity to gut Miranda
in 1975, when it held in Michigan v. Mosley, 81 that the police must
"scrupulously honorO" a suspect's assertion of his right to silence.82
Crucially, the Court rejected the suggestion of Justice White, the author
of a vehement dissent in Miranda itself, that the only question should
be whether or not the waiver was made voluntarily, regardless of
whether the waiver was obtained before or after an invocation of the
right to be silent. Had Justice White's suggestion been accepted, there
would have been no limit to the number of times police interrogators
could approach a suspect in custody despite the suspect's declaration of
a desire not to speak, so long as the ultimate decision to waive the right
to silence could be deemed voluntary. The centerpiece of the Miranda
warnings - their guarantee of a "right" to silence - thus would have
been seriously undermined by the sanctioning of ongoing police efforts
to obtain a statement even in the face of an assertion of the right to silence. To ask merely whether waivers obtained under such circumstances were "voluntary" would virtually recreate the old "voluntariness" regime that Miranda had rejected. Had the Burger Court wished
to eviscerate Miranda without overruling it, Mosley presented a golden
opportunity - which the Court decisively rejected.83
The Court's approach to waiver after invocation of the Miranda
right to counsel has been even more severe than its treatment of waiver
after invocation of the right to silence. In Edwards v. Arizona84 the
Burger Court held that once a suspect asserts the right to counsel in response to Miranda warnings, police-initiated interrogation is banned
completely. Not even "scrupulously honoring" a defendant's assertion

81. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
82. 423 U.S. at 104 (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. While the Mosley Court did find valid Mosley's waiver after his initial invocation of his right to silence, it did so on the narrow facts of the case, which presented
five circumstances not likely to be found in a large number of cases: after his assertion
of his right to silence, Mosley was (1) left alone for more than two hours; (2) moved to
a different location; (3) approached by a different police officer; (4) readvised of his
Miranda rights; and (5) questioned about a different offense. See 423 U.S. at 97-98. The
Court did not indicate what other circumstances might constitute "scrupulous honoring" of a suspect's assertion of his right to silence, and it has not revisited the question
since.
84. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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will do; the police are strictly forbidden by Edwards' bright-line rule
from initiating "interrogation," as generously defined by Innis. The
Rehnquist Court took this powerful prophylactic rule and pushed it two
steps further. First, in 1988 the Court held that Edwards was not merely
specific to the offense for which the defendant was in custody; once a
defendant invokes the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the police
may not initiate interrogation with regard to any offense. 85 Then, in
1990, the Court held that even after a defendant who had invoked the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel had consulted with counsel, police
still could not re-initiate interrogation unless counsel was present at the
re-initiation.86 In language very reminiscent of that of Miranda itself,
the Court insisted on the need for "particular and systematic assurances
that the coercive pressures of custody [are] not the inducing cause" of
waivers and admissions.87 Indeed, Justice Scalia's 1990 dissent eerily
echoed Justice White's 1966 Miranda dissent, asserting that such powerful rules reflect a misguided disdain for all confessions.88
True, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts also have issued a number
of opinions that have limited to some extent the restraining force of the
Miranda conduct rules. In the waiver-after-invocation context, the Court
has made it fairly easy for a court to find that the suspect rather than
the police "re-initiated" contact so as to avoid the Edwards-Minnick
rule. 89 And the Court has made it increasingly less difficult for police to
obtain waivers in the first instance by allowing waivers to be implied as
well as express,90 by permitting some deviation from the specific cate85. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988). Contrast the broad reach of the

Miranda right to counsel with the offense-specific nature of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
86. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
87. 498 U.S. at 155.
88. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 537-38 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) ("The obvious underpinning of the Court's decision is a deep-seated distrust of all
confessions .... [A]s the Court all but admonishes the lawyer to advise the accused to
remain silent, the result adds up to a judicial judgment that e".idence from the accused
should be not used against him in any way, whether compelled or not.") with Minnick,
498 U.S. at 167 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We should, then, rejoice at an honest confession, rather than pity the 'poor fool' who has made it; and we should regret the attempted retraction of that good act, rather than seek to facilitate and encourage it.").
89. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1042 (1983) (holding that a suspect's
general informational question posed after his invocation of the right to counsel "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" - constituted initiation of contact by the
suspect so as permit the police to seek and obtain a valid waiver without first providing
counsel).
90. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (holding valid a
defendant's implicit waiver of his Miranda rights despite his refusal to sign an "Advice
of Rights" form, asserting that "in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred
from the actions and words of the person interrogated").
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chism of the Miranda warnings, 91 and by condoning the continuation of
interrogation in the face of a suspect's "equivocal" or "ambiguous" allusion to Miranda rights.92 The Court even has created one wholesale
exception to Miranda by permitting custodial interrogation of suspects
when "public safety" demands it.93
These decisions limiting the scope of Miranda are not negligible,
but they do not nearly outweigh the stability in the rest of the Court's
Miranda doctrine. Indeed, I would view many of the constraining decisions as a reaction to such stability. It is not accidental that the Court's
decisions cutting back on Miranda focus largely on making it easier to
obtain valid waivers in the first instance: the consequences of an invocation of the right to silence or counsel or both are so stringent that
they have created countervailing pressure in the doctrine to create realistic opportunities for waiver prior to invocation. And while the public
safety "exception" to Miranda announced in Quarles led to dire predictions about the future of the Miranda doctrine,94 that exception has
not spawned any others, nor has the Court expanded it beyond its fairly
narrow facts. Indeed, the Quarles exception to Miranda's conduct rules
has had a much less significant impact on the admissibility of confessions than have changes in decision rules relating to Miranda, which I
discuss below.95
C.

Fourth Amendment

It is more difficult to assess the extent to which the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have departed from the police conduct rules of the
Warren Court in the Fourth Amendment area than in the Fifth and Sixth
91. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989) (holding that the police
could add, without violating Miranda, the following caveat to the warning about the
right to appointed counsel: "We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be
appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
92. See Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2353, 2355 (1994) (holding that
the defendant's statement during interrogation, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," was
not an assertion of the right to counsel and permitting the police to continue interrogation unless a suspect "articulate[s] his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly
that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to
be a request for an attorney" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
93. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (holding that the question,
"Where is the gun?" asked by a police officer of a just-apprehended suspected armed
rapist who was wearing an empty shoulder holster fell within a justified "public safety"
exception to the Miranda doctrine).
94. See, e.g., Marla Belson, Note, "Public Safety" Exception to Miranda: The Supreme Court Writes Away Rights, 61 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 577 (1985); Mary M. Keating,
Note, New York v. Quarles: The Dissolution of Miranda, 30 Vrr..L. L. REv. 441 (1985).
95. See infra Part ill.
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Amendment areas because it is harder to identify with an emblematic
case or two the Warren Court's vision of appropriate Fourth Amendment police conduct. The most famous and controversial Fourth
Amendment decision of the Warren Court was not a conduct rule case
·at all; rather, Mapp v. Qhio96 was a decision rule case that extended the
exclusionary rule for unconstitutionally seized evidence to the states
without purporting to alter the definition of unconstitutional police behavior. The Warren Court's cases that do attempt to mark the bounds of
constitutional police conduct under the Fourth Amendment are far less
emphatic and far more ambivalent than its Fifth and Sixth Amendment
conduct rule cases. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that one principal
idea about the Fourth Amendment that characterized the Warren Court
was the centrality of the warrant process. In a much quoted sentence,
Justice Stewart wrote for the Court in 1967: "[S]earches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. " 97
The importance of the judicial warrant and the concern that exceptions
to the warrant process be few and clear is the police-conduct rule whose
treatment I will trace in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. First, I sketch
three ways in which these later Courts actually validated and even expanded the Warren Court vision. Then, I identify the three most significant ways in which the later Courts departed from the Warren Court
paradigm and attempt nonetheless to maintain my claim of relative stability in the doctrine.
In a series of cases dealing directly with the scope of the warrant
requirement and the nature of the warrant process, the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have explicitly endorsed and expanded upon the preference for warrants expressed by Justice Stewart on behalf of the
Warren Court. In Payton v. New York98 the Court held that warrantless
entries into a home in order to make an arrest were prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that a substantial majority of the
states that had considered the issue permitted such warrantless entries.
The Court distinguished its previous holding that arrests in a public
place do not require a warrant so long as the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that the arrestee is a felon, 99 which relied upon not
merely a majority view, but "virtual unanimity" among the states 100 ad96. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
97. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted).
98. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
99. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
100. Payton, 445 U.S. at 600.
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hering to a "well-settled common-law rule." 101 In the absence of such
overwhelming support for an exception to the warrant requirement, the
Court adhered to the " 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable" 102 - a corollary of the very principal that I have
identified with the Warren Court.
The following year, the Court extended Payton in order to protect
the privacy of a third party whose home was invaded for the arrest of a
suspect named in an arrest warrant. The Court held that to execute an
arrest warrant for a suspect at the home of a third party, the police also
must obtain a search warrant indicating that there has been a judicial
determination of probable cause to believe that the suspect is to be
found in the third party's home. 103 Once again, the Court relied upon the
premise that the warrant process is the presumptive means by which to
"safeguard[] an individual's interest in the privacy of his home and possessions against the unjustified intrusion of the police." 104 A few years
later, the Court further strengthened this presumptive rule that searches
and seizures in the home must be accompanied by a warrant when it
narrowed one of the principal exceptions to the rule, holding that "application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a
home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to
believe that only a minor offense . . . has been committed." 105 The
Court emphasized that this limitation relied upon prior decisions that
"emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are 'few in
number and carefully delineated.' " 106 Most recently, the Court held last
year that the common-law "knock and announce" requirement - the
long-established rule that officers executing a warrant at a home must
knock and announce their presence and identity as police officers before
entering - was not merely a time-honored and sensible practice, but
was constitutionally required under the Fourth Amendment. 107 While the
Court recognized, as does the common law, that there are exceptions to

101. 445 U.S. at 590.
102. 445 U.S. at 586 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477
(1971)).
103. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
104. 451 U.S. at 213.
105. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (refusing to justify the warrantless arrest of the defendant in his home on a drunk driving charge, finding it immaterial that evidence of his blood alcohol level might be lost).
106. 466 U.S. at 749 (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S.
297, 318 (1972), which in turn quoted the Warren Court's landmark Katz opinion).
107. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995).
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the "presumption in favor of announcement," 108 its decision nonetheless serves as a reminder that each step of the warrant process is governed by constitutional norms and thus is subject to judicial oversight.
Aside from these cases directly bolstering the warrant requirement,
the Burger and Rehnqujst Courts were the source of two important doctrines that limited the nature and scope of exceptions to the warrant requirement. First, in a set of three cases, the Court resoundingly banned
discretionary, suspicionless searches and seizures, even when the state
interest was high and the intrusion on the individual was minimal. The
Court first rejected the practice of having roving border patrols randomly stop cars on roads near the border in an effort to thwart the surreptitious entry of illegal aliens. 109 Four years later, the Court held both
that the police may not stop cars randomly in order to check the motorist's driver's license and car registration 110 and that the police may not
stop individuals without individualized suspicion and require them to
identify themselves or to explain their presence, even in high drug areas.111 It is true that these cases left the door wide open to permitting
non-discretionary, suspicionless searches and seizures in order to
achieve the same or similar governmental ends. 112 But the Court's ban
on discretionary spot checks by law enforcement agents in the absence
of individualized suspicion accomplished two important things. At the
level of police practices, it marked a clear and powerful limit to the
scope of warrantless searches and seizures. At a more abstract level, it
signalled a recognition that, even in the service of important governmental ends, "standardless and unconstrained discretion" remains an
"evil" 113 that creates a "grave danger of abuse of discretion" 114 - a
recognition that reflects and reinforces the Warren Court's vision of the
Fourth Amendment.1 1s
108. 115 S. Ct. at 1918.
109. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
110. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
111. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (permitting
fixed checkpoints near the border for discretionless stops of all vehicles passing
through, although individual vehicles could be detained for a brief secondary inspection
on less than the reasonable suspicion necessary to permit a roving border patrol to stop
a car); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (permitting discretionless stops of all vehicles at a sobriety checkpoint, without reaching the issue of the
degree of suspicion necessary to prolong the brief initial stop).
113. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661.
114. 440 U.S. at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. at 559).
115. One of the staunchest defenders of the Warren Court's view of the Fourth
Amendment, Professor Tracey Maclin, has attempted to buttress that view by arguing
that "the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police power and dis-
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Second, the Court has limited the kinds of factors that may create
the reasonable suspicion or probable cause that justifies many searches
and seizures in the absence of a warrant. In the same case forbidding
suspicionless stops of individuals for identification, the Court also held
that mere presence in an area with "a high incidence of drug traffic"
could not create the minimum level of suspicion required by the Fourth
Amendment. 116 The Court explained that though "[t]he record suggests
an understandable desire to assert a police presence . . . [in such an
area], that purpose does not negate Fourth Amendment guarantees." 117
Similarly, the Court also established that mere presence at a location
where a valid search warrant is being executed does not give rise to the
suspicion necessary for the police to conduct even a pat-down frisk. 118
The Court articulated its holding broadly, asserting that "mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity" is insufficient to permit a search or seizure and citing a Warren Court precedent
that had rejected the defendant's association with drug addicts as a basis
for searching him for drugs. 119 Finally, the Court never has approved of
the use of an individual's flight from the police as a sufficient basis for
a valid search or seizure. Though it was asked to so hold in 1988, the
Court ducked the issue, 120 despite a concurrence by Justices Kennedy
and Scalia noting that they would have found the defendant's flight
from the approach of a marked police car sufficient to justify his
seizure. Three years later, Justice Scalia intimated again, in dictum, that
he would find flight sufficient for seizure, 121 but the state government
party to the case apparently considered the position so untenable that it
conceded the issue in the state courts. 122 In all of the recent controversy
over U.S. District Judge Harold Baer's (temporary) decision to suppress
drugs when the police relied heavily on the suspects' flight in order to

cretion." Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. &
MARYL. R.Ev. 197, 201 (1993).
116. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49 (1979).
117. 443 U.S. at 52.
118. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
119. 444 U.S. at 91 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)).
120. See Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (holding that the defendant
was not seized by the police at the time that he discarded the drugs that gave rise to his
valid arrest, rather than that his flight from the police justified his seizure).
121. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 623 n.l (1991) ("That it would be
unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, young men who scatter in panic upon the mere
sighting of the police is not self-evident, and arguably contradicts proverbial common
sense. See Proverbs 28: 1 ('The wicked flee when no man pursueth '). We do not decide
that point here .... ").
122. See 499 U.S. at 623 n.l.
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justify the search and seizure at issue, 123 it is little noted that the Supreme Court never has permitted the inference that Judge Baer was
loath to draw to suffice as the sole basis for such an intrusion.
These three holdings together - prohibiting the use of a person's
location, association, or. flight, without more, as a sufficient foundation
for a search or seizure - substantially limit warrantless searches and
seizures by law enforcement agents. If these factors were permitted,
without more, to give rise to probable cause or reasonable suspicion,
law enforcement agents would have a much reduced need to resort to
the warrant process, given that they would have the power to stop and
search or frisk large segments of the population virtually at will. These
cases, along with the Court's cases banning discretionary spot checks,
indirectly support the Warren Court's preference for warrants by precluding some of the potentially largest exceptions to the warrant
process.
I do not mean to suggest by the foregoing that the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts' constructions of the Fourth Amendment have not
moved the understanding of acceptable police practices in any discernible direction. They have, and I now wish to explore the nature of that
direction. Although a large number of individual cases have led to
claims, by dissenting Justices and commentators, that the Burger or
Rehnquist Court has performed the coup de grace on the Warren
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 124 I believe that the most sig123. In United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), Judge Harold
Baer ruled that the police did not have a reasonable suspicion that Carol Bayless was
involved in criminal activity when they stopped her automobile at five o'clock in the
morning in the Washington Heights neighborhood of New York City and (successfully)
searched it for drugs. The police argued that the defendant's presence at an unusual
hour in an area known for its high incidence of drug activity, in addition to the fact that
she was driving a car with out-of-state license plates, factored into their decision to pull
her over. Critical to the officer's argument that they had the requisite "reasonable suspicion," however, was the observation by one of the officers of several men placing large
duffel bags in the trunk of the defendant's car and then running away upon seeing the
officers. In his initial ruling, Judge Baer held that even if this officer's testimony were
truthful, these factors together did not add up to the suspicion necessary for a constitutional stop. In particular, Judge Baer discounted the importance of the men's flight from
the police, noting that given the known level of police corruption in this particular
neighborhood, "it would have been unusual" for the men not to have run away from
the police. 913 F. Supp. at 242. After a hailstorm of criticism, including some hints that
President Clinton might seek his resignation, Judge Baer reversed his initial decision to
exclude the evidence. See Don Van Natta Jr., Not Suspicious To Flee Police, Judge Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at Bl; Don Van Natta Jr., Under Pressure, Federal
Judge Reverses Decision in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238-39 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of "turn(ing] its back" on "fundamental principles" of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Greenwood v. California, 486 U.S. 35, 46
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nificant changes in police conduct rules can be grouped into three principal categories: (1) the definition of voluntary cooperation with the police, through the doctrines defining "seizures" and "consent"; (2) the
definition of "reasonable expectations of privacy," through the doctrines defining "searches"; and (3) the development of a category of
searches reflecting "special needs" that render the warrant requirement
inapplicable. In each of these areas, there has been a noticeable shift
during the Burger and Rehnquist Court eras toward loosening constraints on law enforcement. I argue, however, that this shift does not
represent as significant a departure from the Warren Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as might superficially appear, nor does it
compare to much greater changes in decision rules that I discuss in
more detail below. 125
The later decisions that are most out of sync with the spirit (if not
the letter) of the Warren Court's criminal procedure are the cases involving determinations of what constitutes free and voluntary cooperCj.tion with the police. In 1973 in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Burger
Court held that an individual's consent to a search by the police126 could
be deemed valid even though the person was not informed and, indeed,
did not know that he was free to decline the police request for such
consent. 127 The Court distinguished Miranda, in which the Warren
Court had recognized that suspects in some circumstances need information about their rights in order for the waiver of them to be deemed
voluntary, by limiting Miranda's insight to its factual context of custodial interrogation. 128 The Court also distinguished the waiver standard
for trial rights, which required that the government demonstrate the
defendant's "intentional . . . abandonment of a known right or privilege" in order to establish a valid waiver, 129 by essentially creating a hierarchy of constitutional rights with trial rights above Fourth Amendment rights because the former but not the latter have the purpose of

(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that "members of our society will be shocked
to learn" of the majority's holding); Lynn S. Searle, The "Administrative" Search from
Dewey to Burger: Dismantling the Fourth Amendment, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 261
(1989); James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the Warrant
Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1103 (1992).
125. See infra Part ill.
126. Presumably, any search falls within the Schneckloth holding, whether it is of
the defendant's "person[], house[], papers, [or] effects," see U.S. CONST. amend. IV,
even though the search in Schneckloth itself involved a car.
127. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
128. See 412 U.S. at 246 ("The considerations that informed the Court's holding
in Miranda are simply inapplicable in the present case.").
129. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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"promoting the fair ascertainment of truth." 130 Instead of requiring
Miranda-style warnings or other proof that the defendant had knowledge of the right to refuse consent, the Court held that the validity of
consent to search was to be determined by the familiar, pre-Miranda
"voluntariness" test, which evaluated the totality of the circumstances.
The Court simply was unpersuaded by Justice Marshall's argument in
dissent that " 'a reasonable person might read an officer's "May I" as
the courteous expression of a demand backed by force of law.' " 131
The Rehnquist Court issued an opinion of similar spirit, though in
a slightly different doctrinal context, when it elaborated on the definition of "seizures" under the Fourth Amendment in Florida v. Bostick132
in 1991. The standard that the Court purported to apply - that a
seizure of the defendant's person by the police takes place when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave 133 - does not seem very
different from a standard that the Warren Court itself might have invented. But its application in Bostick led the Court to conclude that
"bus sweeps" by law enforcement agents - in which armed officers
board interstate buses stopped en route to "request" that some or all of
the passengers permit their baggage to be searched for drugs - do not
necessarily constitute "seizures" of the passengers. 134 As in
Schneckloth, the Court was unconvinced that the police conduct at issue
necessarily "convey[ed] a message that compliance with their requests
[was] required.'' 135
There can be no question that both Bostick and Schneckloth are
quite different in tone from the Warren Court's precedents in the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment contexts (Miranda and Massiah). The Warren
Court clearly took a much more jaundiced view of the possibility for
freedom rather than coercion in interactions between citizens and the
police, and its skepticism led it to create strong prophylactic rules designed to prevent the most coercive situations from developing, given
the difficulty of identifying such situations ex post. It thus seems quite
likely that the Warren Court would have approached and resolved the
particular issues presented in Bostick and Schneckloth differently. I cannot and do not wish to minimize the distance in both world-view and
130. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 242.
131. 412 U.S. at 275-76 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Bustamonte v.
Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1971)).
132. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
133. See 501 U.S. at 435.
134. See also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (holding that INS agents did
not "seize" workers when they entered factories to randomly question workers, despite
the fact that some of the agents stationed themselves by the factory exits).
135. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435.
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doctrinal approach between, say, Miranda and Schneckloth. The Burger
and Rehnquist Courts quite definitely have refused to extend Miranda's
concerns and prophylactic solution into the Fourth Amendment arena.
These cases thus present something of a challenge to my "relative stability" thesis. The most that can be said in defense of stability of conduct rules in this context across Courts is that the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, in fashioning their "consent" and "seizure" doctrines, never
purported to overrule or even limit Warren Court precedent regarding
the Fourth Amendment. Rather, their approach diverged from the understanding of police-citizen contact reflected in the Warren Court's Fifth
and Sixth Amendment precedents, and it thus represented a departure
more from the spirit than from the letter of the Warren Court's work.
Moreover, even if I fully accepted the contention that the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts' cases in this area have, in some important sense,
"changed" conduct rules for the police, I still would maintain that this
change - even when combined with the two other changes I explore
next - pales in comparison to the Courts' radical reworking of decision rules.
The second area in which the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
most diverged from the Warren Court in fashioning police conduct rules
is the definition of "reasonable expectations of privacy." The Katz
opinion, which I have used as an exemplar of the Warren Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 136 re-imagined the boundaries of
"searches" under the Fourth Amendment when it rejected the thenreigning understanding that the Fourth Amendment protected certain
"constitutionally protected areas" 137 by reference to the common law of
trespass, and instead embraced the more fluid and more openly normative concept of "reasonable expectations of privacy." 138 This concept
and phraseology have remained constant from 1967 until today, but the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts have elucidated notions of "reasonableness" in expectations of privacy that are increasingly deferential to the
government.
For example, in the last twenty years the Court has held that the
government invades no reasonable expectation of privacy (and thus
needs no probable cause or, indeed, suspicion of any kind) when it flies
over and photographs a securely fenced-in backyard, 139 seizes and
136. See supra text accompanying note 97.
137. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 & n.9 (1967).
138. 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
139. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). The Supreme Court has not
yet found any airplane "fly-over" to infringe upon reasonable expectations of privacy.
The same tenn as Ciraolo, the Court held that the Environmental Protection Agency did
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searches garbage left at the curb for collection, 140 subpoenas financial
information about a banking customer from a bank, 141 or arranges for
the phone company to set up a "pen register" to record the telephone
numbers dialed from a particular residence. 142 In each of these cases,
the Court invoked one or both of the following two concepts: first, that
the government should not be required to "avert its eyes" from things
that a person knowingly exposes to public view, and second, that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her "misplaced
trust" that a third party will not reveal secrets to the government.
One could argue (and many have) that the Court's applications of
these concepts in the above cases are extreme and unpersuasive. 143 After
all, how likely is it that a member of the public will fly over one's
backyard (or industrial complex) at an altitude low enough to see any
details, much less that the aircraft's occupants will have a $22,000 prenot conduct a "search" of the defendant's business premises when it hired a commercial aerial photographer to fly over the plant and photograph it with a highly sophisticated camera after the defendant had refused to permit an on-site inspection. The Court
analogized the open areas of Dow's industrial complex to nonprivate "open fields"
rather than to protected "curtilage," relying on the commercial as opposed to residential
nature of the premises. In addition, the Court noted that the equipment used by the government was available commercially to members of the public and that the information
revealed by the fly-over was limited in nature. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227 (1986). Three years later, five members of the Court found that the government's use of a helicopter hovering at 400 feet to view a backyard greenhouse,
where marijuana was found to be growing, also did not constitute a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment, see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion),
though Justice O'Connor noted in her separate concurrence that flight below 400 feet
might begin to infringe upon reasonable expectations of privacy if it was shown that
public use of airspace below that point was sufficiently rare. See 488 U.S. at 455
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
140. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
141. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
142. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
143. See, e.g., CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE! AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS § 4.03(c), at 113 (3d ed.
1993) (maintaining that the "fly-over" cases "stretch to the breaking point the pronouncement in Katz that Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to what a person 'knowingly exposes to the public' ");Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 IND. LJ. 549, 575 (1990) (arguing that the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts' "search" cases "demonstrate the Court's misuse of the Katz
knowing exposure rationale to sidestep the fourth amendment reasonableness requirement"); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 257, 271 (1984) ("[F)ar from proving an impediment to expanding the
unregulated investigative powers of the police, Katz has supplied the Burger Court with
a handy verbal formula for exempting a variety of intrusive law enforcement practices
. . . . ");Michael Campbell, Note, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of
the Supreme Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191, 200 (1986) (suggesting that the Court "has too readily equated the potential exposure of information
with the absence of any privacy interest in that information").
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cision camera with which to photograph the premises? 144 And given the
remoteness of these possibilities, is it fair to conclude that one has
"knowingly" exposed the contents of one's backyard (or the layout of
one's industrial complex) to public view? Moreover, it is not entirely
plausible to describe a decision to place one's garbage at the curb when required to so· by local ordinance 145 - as evincing "misplaced
trust" in the reliability of the local garbage removal crew rather than
mere acquiescence ·in the garbage collection procedures established by
law. Similarly, it may not be "trust" but rather the necessity of functioning in the modem world that leads people to reveal information to,
say, banks and telephone companies.
But while the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' application of these
concepts may seem far-fetched or excessively deferential to the government's interests in information gathering, it is important to recognize
the ways in which the Warren Court's own Fourth Amendment cases set
the stage for these later developments. It was the Katz Court that came
up with the "reasonable expectations of privacy" rubric for Fourth
Amendment "searches," without giving any guidance on how to determine "reasonableness" in the myriad of circumstances that were likely
to (and did) arise later, thus creating a normative vacuum for later
Courts to fill. Moreover, the "avert the eyes" concept derived directly
from the Katz Court's rejection of the notion that privacy adheres to
certain physical "areas":
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 146

Once again, having announced that "knowing exposure" falls outside
of the I:ourth Amendment, the Katz Court - and the Warren Court in
the few years that remained post-Katz - were crucially and tantalizingly silent on what sorts of behavior constituted such exposure, even
as to the facts of the Katz case itself. Each year, a new crop of first-year
law students asks whether an undercover agent instructed by the government to lean casually against the glass wall of Katz's telephone

144. Cf Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 242 n.4 (1986) (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting cost of camera used by EPA's hired
photographer).
145. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 54-55 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
146. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (citations omitted and
emphasis added).
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booth and listen to his conversations (in lieu of an electronic "bug")
would have constituted a "search" or whether Katz's decision to converse within earshot of the government agent would have constituted
"knowing exposure" to the public. 147 Although one can speculate that
the Warren Court would not have construed "knowing exposure" in the
broad way that the later Courts did, the Warren Court's work not only
did not foreclose these later constructions but in fact opened the door to
them by replacing the common law of trespass with a broad, but empty,
normative concept as the reigning constitutional standard.
Similarly, it was the Warren Court that created the "misplaced
trust" doctrine and extended it to a variety of contexts. In Hoffa v.
United States 148 the Court gave birth to the "misplaced trust" doctrine
when it held that no search occurred when the government instructed a
confidential informant to befriend the infamous Jimmy Hoffa during the
proceeding known as the Test Fleet trial. The informant was successful
at being included among Hoffa's trusted associates during the trial, and
he listened to and reported upon the conversations carried on in his
presence, thus helping the government make out a case of jury tampering against Hoffa. Focusing not on the government's intent or actions in
enlisting the informant, but rather upon Hoffa's state of mind, the Court
explained that Hoffa was not entitled to rely upon "his misplaced confidence that Partin [the informant] would not reveal his wrongdoing." 149
On the same day as its decision in Hoffa, the Court also endorsed aversion of the "misplaced trust" doctrine in Lewis v. United States, iso
when it found that an undercover agent's purchase of illegal drugs from
the defendant in the defendant's home was not a "search." Once again,
the Court concluded that the government's "fraud and deception" as to
the true identity of the undercover agent was not the issue, given that
the defendant had "invited the undercover agent to his home for the
specific purpose of executing a felonious sale of narcotics" and that the
agent's actions went no further than necessary to achieve that goa1. 1s1
As in the "avert the eyes" cases, the Warren Court's "misplaced
trust" cases failed to articulate any limiting principle to the concept.
147. The class tends to go on in this vein for a while: What if the government
hired a lip-reader who stood not far from Katz's glass telephone booth in order to read

his lips? What if Katz were to use one of the new unenclosed public telephones which
permit those at the next phone or two to overhear one's conversations? What if Katz
were to use his own portable cellular phone in a public place, like a bus stop or a park
bench?
148. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
149. 385 U.S. at 302.
150. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
151. 385 U.S. at 210.
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The same first-year students who question the reach of Katz also ask
whether Hoffa means that the government could have hired the hotel
staff (dining room waiters, room service deliverers, maids, etc.) to listen
to and report upon what they could hear while "invited" into Hoffa's
presence, or whether Lewis means that government agents can pose as
meter readers or package deliverers in order to gain "invited" access to
residences. Once again, while we might guess that the Warren Court
would not extend its concept as far as later Courts have done, neither
the Hoffa nor Lewis majority made any attempt to articulate limiting
principles other than by simply articulating the facts of the individual
cases. It is thus hard to make a case that the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts' interpretations of the "misplaced trust" doctrine represent a
major departure - much less a "counter-revolution" - from the work
of the Warren Court. Even more fundamentally, Hoffa and Lewis together reflect the Warren Court's own ambivalence about the very
Fourth Amendment principal with which I have sought to identify it
(that exceptions to the warrant requirement be few and clear). It would
be easy to recast the arguments made by the Hoffa and Lewis Court in
the following way: sending government agents to look and listen in
places where they would not otherwise have access to information is
both a "search" and a "seizure" of the defendant's conversation, but
such searches and seizures are not "unreasonable" ones prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the lack of a judicial warrant,
given the needs of the government and the expectations of the defendant.152 Viewed in this light, Hoffa and Lewis in effect create a large and
ill-defined exception to the preference for warrants articulated in Katz,
though they do so almost invisibly, by deeming a potentially wide range
of governmental activity simply beyond the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. These cases thus demonstrate more continuity between the
Warren Court and later Courts than initially meets the eye.
The third and most direct challenge to the Fourth Amendment
principal that I have associated with the Warren Court has been the extensive development of an exception to both the warrant process and
the warrant-related probable cause requirement for searches and
seizures in contexts in which the government can demonstrate "special
needs." The Court first articulated this idea in 1985 in New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 153 when it held that searches of students by school officials
could be conducted without warrants and with less than the "probable
152. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107

HARV.

L.

REv. 757, 803-04 (1994) (arguing that the "search" and "seizure" cases should be
reconceived as general "reasonableness" cases).
153. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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cause" required when law enforcement agents make warrantless
searches. It was actually Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment
in T.L.O., who turned the phrase that later became so important when
he acknowledged that sometimes "exceptional circumstances" arise "in
which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." 1s4
The need for school officials to have quick and flexible procedures for
maintaining order was envisioned by the Court as one such circumstance, but in the next ten years, the Court used Justice Blackmun's
T.L.0. locution five more times. The Court held that warrants and probable cause are not always necessary when the government as employer
searches the office of a public employee, 155 when law enforcement
agents conduct an administrative search of a closely regulated business
as authorized by statute, 156 when a probation officer searches the home
of a probationer, 157 when the government as employer requires some of
its employees to take drug tests under certain conditions, 158 or when
school officials require random drug testing of a certain subset of the
student body. 159 In each of these cases, the Court rejected a rigid warrant or probable cause "requirement," but instead conducted a more
free-wheeling "balancing" of governmental needs against individual
privacy. 160
The proliferation of cases under the "special needs" rubric is an
obvious and direct challenge to the idea that the warrant process should
dominate the realm of governmental searches and that exceptions to this
process should be few and clearly delineated. The sheer number of circumstances in which the Court has found the existence of "special
needs" is in tension with the goal of the Warren Court that exceptions
to the warrant requirement be "few." But the number of cases (and of
potential future cases) within the exception is itself a function of the
haziness of the concept of "special needs beyond the normal need for
law enforcement." What, after all, constitutes the "normal" need for
law enforcement? One could argue that a strong limiting principle is
implicit in the Supreme Court's cases: perhaps the "special needs" cat154. 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
155. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
156. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
157. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
158. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
159. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
160. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 ("When faced with such special needs, we
have not hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable cause requirements in the particular context.").
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egory applies when the government is acting to achieve some regulatory
goal separate and distinct from its goal of enforcing the criminal laws
and when it does so through governmental actors separate and distinct
from criminal law enforcement personnel. 161 The enforcement of school
discipline by school officials and the monitoring of compliance with
conditions of employment by the government-as-employer162 present
clean examples of such cases. The administrative-search doctrine 163 departs slightly from this model in that it permits such searches to be done
by law enforcement agents, though with non-criminal goals. Such a limiting principle would prevent the "special needs" category from challenging my thesis about relative stability in police conduct rules because it would limit the category to actions taken by nonpolice
governmental actors in noncriminal cases. 164
This implicit limiting principle, however, has become much more
dubious in the wake of the Court's decision in Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz, 165 when it upheld against constitutional challenge a
state police initiative establishing a program of suspicionless stops and
brief inspections of all vehicles passing through "sobriety checkpoints"
set up on public roads. The goal of the program was to enforce a criminal prohibition against driving while under the influence of alcohol, and
the state police were the personnel who created and implemented the
program. For once, it was a criminal defendant who invoked the Court's
"special needs" cases, arguing that the enforcement of drunk driving
laws fell, if anything at all did, within the category of "the normal need
for law enforcement" and thus that the government should have to
demonstrate either probable cause or reasonable suspicion before exe161. This rationale would have reflected a belief that the Fourth Amendment requires different procedures for searches and seizures relating to "criminal" as opposed
to "noncriminal" law enforcement. Professor Bill Stuntz has offered a theory of the
Fourth Amendment that would support such a distinction, arguing that the Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should be reoriented toward the special threats posed
by the police, rather than toward the lack the informational privacy that necessarily attends the regulatory state. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of
Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1016 (1995).
162. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
163. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (involving search of
closely regulated business by police officers).
164. Indeed, the "special needs" category, when limited in this way, plausibly
represents an expansion rather than a contraction of Fourth Amendment rights. Before
the 1970s, it was not clear that the Fourth Amendment applied at all to searches and
seizures in schools or government offices. While the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
maintained a relatively low and easily manipulable standard for evaluating such
searches and seizures, they also have insisted that students and public employees did
not leave their rights at the schoolhouse or office door.
165. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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cuting a warrantless stop of an automobile. 166 The Court effectively
dodged the defendant's argument, holding that the "special needs"
cases in no way displaced the Court's prior holdings regarding suspicionless stops of motorists. The Court noted that it had once before upheld suspicionless stops of motorists by approving fixed checkpoints at
or near the border to detect the entry of illegal aliens. 167 The Court then
invoked more general language from its decision in Brown v. Texas 168 to
the effect that determining the constitutionality of "seizures that are less
intrusive than a traditional arrest ... involves a weighing of the gravity
of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference
with individual liberty." 169 This balancing test is identical to the freewheeling balancing that the Court has employed under the rubric of
"special needs" and thus represents a potentially enormous extension of
that analysis to cases of run-of-the-mill criminal law enforcement. 170
Thus, I obviously do think that the "special needs" exception, especially after Sitz, represents a challenge to my thesis of relative stability in police conduct rules. I have three somewhat different responses to
this challenge. The first response is that the Court has not yet simply
converted the warrant requirement and its expanding exceptions into the
less rigid, more free-wheeling balancing act that is evident in the "special needs" context. The Court's decision in Arizona v. Hicks 111 is the
clearest example of its resistance to the use of a free-wheeling balancing test to determine generally the reasonableness of Fourth Amendment searches and seizures. The Hicks Court held that a police officer's
moving of stereo equipment in order to read obscured serial numbers
constituted a "search" requiring probable cause, rejecting the suggestion of three dissenters that mere "cursory inspections" required a
lesser degree of suspicion. The majority explained that the dissent's attempt to finely calibrate the level of justification for a search to the
level of intrusion resulting from it would create a "new thicket of
166. 496 U.S. at 449.
167. See 496 U.S. at 449-50, 453-54 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976)).
168. See 496 U.S. at 499-50, 453-54 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)
(holding that the police may not, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, stop individuals and require them to identify themselves without individualized suspicion)).
169. 443 U.S. at 50-51.
170. Indeed, some state courts have read Sitz in just this manner, permitting suspicionless stops in the most routine cases of "normal law enforcement." See, e.g., People
v. Cascarano, 587 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Crim. Ct. 1992) (upholding a checkpoint to enforce the
criminal prohibition against auto theft); State v. Graham, No. 57622, 1990 Ohio App.
LEXIS 4744 (Nov. 1, 1990) (upholding a checkpoint to aid in drug interdiction).
171. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
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Fourth Amendment law" 172 and that the Court previously had permitted
such balancing of justification and intrusion only in cases of "special
operational necessities. " 173 The Hicks case is remarkable not only because it emphatically rejected the "special needs" balancing test as the
dominant Fourth Amendment standard, but because it did so on such
unsympathetic facts, leading Justice Powell to inquire plaintively "what
[the police officer] should have done in these circumstances." 174 Indeed,
it is cases like Hicks that fueled Professor Akhil Amar's urgent call for
a general reasonableness standard to govern Fourth Amendment search
and seizure law. 175 Amar's recent and outraged176 critique of current law
is perhaps the best evidence that a general reasonableness standard has
not yet won out in the Supreme Court.
My second response to the change represented by the proliferation
of "special needs" cases is that it not as much of a "change" from the
Warren Court's own approach to special circumstances as might first
appear. The forebear of all of the later "special needs" cases is itself a
Warren Court decision, Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco. 111
The Camara Court overturned an earlier decision, Frank v. Maryland, 178
which permitted a municipal health inspector to perform a home inspection without a warrant. But though the Camara majority, true to the vision that I have ascribed to the Warren Court, held that administrative
inspections to enforce safety and health standards must be authorized by
a judicial warrant, the Court also held that the standard of probable
cause should be relaxed in such circumstances. Noting that "routine periodic inspections of all structures" were "the only effective way to
seek universal compliance" with municipal health and safety codes, 179
the Court held that, in the housing inspection context, routine "area"
inspections are "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. In so holding, the Court observed that "there can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails" 180 - exactly the balancing test later

172. 480 U.S. at 328.
173. 480 U.S. at 327.
174. 480 U.S. at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell noted that the police
had lawfully entered the defendant's apartment after a shot was fired through the floor
and had found several guns, a stocking-cap mask, drug paraphernalia, and two sets of
expensive stereo components of a type that were frequently stolen. See 480 U.S. at 331.
175. See Amar, supra note 152, at 768 & n.38, 769 & n.42.
176. See id. at 757 ("The Fourth Amendment today is an embarrassment.").
177. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
178. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
179. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535-36.
180. 387 U.S. at 536-37.
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used in all of the "special needs" cases. Therefore, the Court concluded, triumphantly but bizarrely, "it is obvious that 'probable cause'
to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied
with respect to a particular dwelling," even though such standards "will
not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the
particular dwelling." 181 The Camara Court thus redefined probable
cause as flowing from the "reasonableness" of routine inspections
rather than from any quantum of knowledge about the particular places
searched. Although Camara used the language of probable cause standard and insisted on judicial process to implement that standard, in fact
it approved suspicionless searches based on their general reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment, setting the stage for the "special needs"
cases of the 1980s and 1990s. 182
Finally, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts occasionally have used
the reasonableness standard from the "special needs" cases in ways
that actually have been more protective of individual liberties than the
strict warrant and probable cause requirements could be. In Tennessee v.
Garner, 183 the Court held that the use of deadly force to apprehend a
fleeing felon was constitutionally unreasonable, despite the existence of
probable cause to make a forcible seizure of the felon's person. The
same year, the Court in Winston v. Lee184 also held that the government
could not surgically remove a bullet from the chest of a defendant for
evidentiary purposes, despite the existence of both probable cause to
believe that the bullet was evidence of a crime and a judicial order authorizing the removal of the bullet after a full hearing. These departures
from the Warren Court's preference for warrants, while not actually
foreshadowed by any particular Warren Court decision, seem in accord

181. 387 U.S. at 538.
182. The Camara Court was careful, however, to distinguish criminal cases from
civil regulatory ones, noting that "a routine inspection ... of private property is a less
hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities
of crime." 387 U.S. at 530. Thus, one might argue that Sitz, at least, is a major departure from Camara. I believe, however, that Camara prefigured the use of a reasonableness standard even in the criminal investigatory context by insisting that it merely was
interpreting the textual "probable cause" standard in light of the Fourth Amendment's
general command of "reasonableness" in both civil and criminal contexts. By stating its
holding at this high level of normative abstraction - "[t]he warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable
governmental interest" - the Camara Court opened the door for later Courts to bring
their own normative judgments about constitutional "reasonableness" to bear. 387 U.S.
at 539.
183. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
184. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
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with the Warren Court's concerns about police overreaching and the
need to protect individual autonomy that are reflected most clearly in its
Fifth Amendment cases. 185 And the vestigial members of the Warren
Court who remained during the Burger and Rehnquist Court years enthusiastically supported these decisions. Indeed, Justice Brennan, writing for the Lee Court, explicitly noted that sliding scales can slide both
ways:
Where the Court has found a lesser expectation of privacy, ... the Court
has held that the Fourth Amendment's protections are correspondingly
less stringent. Conversely, however, the Fourth Amendment's command
that searches be "reasonable" requires that when the State seeks to intrude upon an area in which our society recognizes a significantly heightened privacy interest, a more substantial justification is required to make
the search "reasonable. "186

Thus, even if the Burger and Rehnquist Courts had not articulated the
need for a general reasonableness analysis in cases of "special needs,"
the Warren Court, given enough time, might well have invented just
such a category itself.

* * *
Even the Court's Fourth Amendment police-conduct norms, which
have changed much more over the past twenty-five years than have its
Fifth or Sixth Amendment norms, do not make out a case for radical
change in conduct rules during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. I do
not mean to refute any claims about the different Courts' differing "ideologies," 187 whether that term is taken to ID:ean simply different rationales for individual doctrines, or different perspectives on larger concepts such as the purposes of criminal justice, the nature of freedom and
coercion, and the relative characters and motivations of the police and
criminal offenders. Rather, I contend merely that a conscientious
description of what police investigative practices are permitted and forbidden by the Federal Constitution would not read very differently in
1969, the year of Earl Warren's retirement, and today, ten years after
William Rehnquist succeeded Warren Burger as Chief Justice. What differences do exist between these two hypothetical lists - many though
not all of which I have catalogued above - are not nearly as extreme
as the differences in decision rules that have developed over the same
period of time, to which I now turn my attention.

185. See supra section II.B.
186. Lee, 470 U.S. at 767 (citation omitted).
187. See Arenella, supra note 5, at 188-89.
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RELATIVE EXPLOSION IN "lNCLUSIONARY RULES"

While the Court has left relatively intact its instructions to police
officers about proper police practices (conduct rules), it has changed
radically the consequences of violating those instructions (decision
rules). While the Court did not purport to overrule the Fourth Amendment exclusionary ru1e, just as it declined to overturn Miranda or
Massiah, the Court nonetheless promulgated a series of what I term
"inclusionary rules." I use this term because I seek to sweep more
broadly than the narrow category of what the Court and commentators
have deemed "exceptions" to the exclusionary rules of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments; I mean to identify a larger and as yet unnamed category of rules that have the effect of mitigating the consequences to the government in criminal prosecutions of the unconstitutional behavior of law enforcement agents. Thus, my "inclusionary
rules" are those that permit the use at trial of unconstitutionally obtained evidence or that let stand convictions resulting from trials at
which such evidence was admitted. I intend to make no claim about
whether or not the Court's inclusionary rules are a good idea or a bad
idea, or about whether they are faithful or illegitimate exercises of constitutional interpretation (any more than I intended to defend or attack
the conduct rules promulgated by the Warren Court and left relatively
intact by later Courts). Rather, I argue simply that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' inclusionary rules represent a departure from the Warren
Court's understanding of the judicial consequences of constitutional violations by the police that is much more dramatic than the changes made
in police-conduct rules over the same period of time. To the extent that
there has been a "counter-revolution" in constitutional criminal procedure, it is here.
The inclusionary rules to which I refer can be organized into two
general categories. First, there are rules that permit the government to
avoid the exclusion of evidence at trial. The Court has generated a number of doctrines - among them, the doctrines relating to standing, the
"good-faith" exception to the warrant requirement, "fruits" of constitutional violations, and impeachment - that permit the use at trial of evidence that was obtained unconstitutionally. Second, there are rules that
deal with the review and reversal of convictions. The Court has structured the appellate and postconviction processes - through the doctrines relating to harmless error and the scope of habeas review - to
permit convictions to stand despite the admission of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence. In both of these areas, the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have been much more straightforward and much more extreme
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in their rejection of the work of the Warren Court than they have been
in the domain of conduct rules.
A.

Exclusion of Evidence

Because the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is more clearly a
remedy separate from the right itself than either the Fifth or even the
Sixth Amendment's mandates of exclusion, and because the remedy of
exclusion does much more to deter future violations than it does to
"make whole" a defendant whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated, 188 the remedy has been particularly vulnerable to exceptions
promulgated in the name of fine-tuning the rule to accord with its rationale of deterrence. 189 IrQnically, however, the threshold requirement of
standing, although not always conceived of as an "exception" to the
exclusionary rule, in fact operates to limit the scope of exclusion in
ways that seem to run counter to the deterrence rationale offered for the
rule. The standing doctrine holds that only a defendant whose personal
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the government's misconduct can move to exclude the evidence that the government illegally
seized. Many have noted that this doctrine is hard to square with the rationale of deterrence, given that the aggrieved or nonaggrieved nature
of the defendant has no connection at all to the deterrent effect of a successful motion to suppress. 190 But the Warren Court and the Burger and
188. This view of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule clearly has dominated
in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. The clearest statement of the prospective nature of
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974), in which the Court described the rule as "a judicially created remedy designed
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than
a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." 414 U.S. at 348. But the Warren
Court, too, even while asserting that the exclusionary rule was "part and parcel" of the
Fourth Amendment, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961), nonetheless suggested that the rule had to be extended to state court prosecutions in part because of the
failure of nonconstitutional local remedies to adequately deter Fourth Amendment violations. 367 U.S. at 651-53; see also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965)
(noting that "all of the cases since Wolf [in 1949) requiring the exclusion of illegal evidence have been based on the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police
action").
189. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908-11 (1984) (listing exceptions
generated by the deterrence rationale, including Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(habeas), Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (grand jury), United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976) (civil proceedings), and United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980)
(impeachment)).
190. For the best exploration of how a robust theory of deterrence likely would
lead to a different standard for Fourth Amendment standing and of why the Court nonetheless has rejected an alternative standard, see Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 247, 275-78 (1988); see also id. at 274 n.132

2506

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:2466

Rehnquist Courts alike have insisted on a "personal rights" view of
standing to invoke the exclusionary rules, even while acknowledging
that the primary rationale for the rule is deterrence of official
misconduct. 191
This apparent similarity across Courts in general approaches to the
issue of standing, however, obscures important differences. Part of the
Warren Court's "revolution" in criminal procedure was a substantial
expansion of the rules of Fourth Amendment standing. In the landmark
case of Jones v. United States, 192 a defendant, charged with possession
of drugs, sought standing to object to an illegal search of the apartment
in which he was staying with the owner's permission in the owner's absence, despite the fact that the defendant had no property rights in the
premises searched. The Warren Court reversed the lower courts' rejection of the defendant's claim to standing, holding that Fourth Amendment standing no longer should rest upon "the common law ... of private property law." 193 Instead, the Jones Court, in true Warren Court
fashion, offered two sweeping rules that briefly would govern a large
percentage of future standing cases. First, the Court held that in cases
such as Jones in which the defendant is charged with a possessory offense, the defendant should have automatic standing to contest the
seizure of the items that are alleged by the government to be in the
defendant's possession. 194 Second, as an independent, alternative ground
for conferring standing upon Jones, the Court held that, regardless of
formal property interests, "anyone legitimately on [the] premises where
a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him." 195 Between
(citing other scholars who have noted and criticized the tension between the rationale of
deterrence for the exclusionary rule and the doctrine of Fourth Amendment standing).
191. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (reflecting the Warren
Court's acceptance of both the deterrent rationale for the exclusionary rule and the
"personal rights" basis for standing); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (same for
Burger Court).
192. 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salrucci, 448 U.S. 83
(1980).
193. 362 U.S. at 266.
194. See 362 U.S. at 260-61, 264. The Court worried that in that absence of such a
rule, the only way for a defendant to prove his standing would in effect convict him on
the merits of the case, given that his suppression hearing testimony could be admitted
against him at trial. Thus, the government often could win the suppression hearing and
then win the trial by taking contradictory positions - first, that the contraband did not
belong to the defendant at the suppression hearing and then that the contraband did belong to the defendant at trial. The Jones Court concluded: "It is not consonant with the
amenities, to put it mildly, of the administration of criminal justice to sanction such
squarely contradictory assertions of power by the Government." 362 U.S. at 263-64.
195. 362 U.S. at 267.
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the automatic standing rule for possessory offenses and the "legitimately on the premises" test for standing to contest nonpersonal
searches, the Warren Court managed to define the scope of "personal"
Fourth Amendment rights in such a broad and categorical fashion that
the seemingly strict requirement that defendants be personally "aggrieved" by governmental misconduct in order to invoke the exclusionary rule was no longer a substantial barrier to standing. 196
While the broadest and most categorical of the Warren Court's
conduct rules for the police - Miranda and Massiah - have survived
to this day, Jones was quickly and decisively rejected. In 1976, the Burger Court overruled the "legitimately on the premises" standard for determining standing to contest nonpersonal searches. In Rakas v.
Illinois 191 the Court held that a passenger in a car had no standing to
contest the legality of a search that led to the seizure of items from the
glove compartment and the area under the seat. The standard of "legitimate presence," ruled the Court, provided "too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights." 198 Instead of relying upon categorical rules for standing, the Rakas Court invoked the "legitimate
expectations of privacy" language that the Warren Court had developed
in Katz to reject, as Jones had done, the reliance on common law categories to determine Fourth Amendment rights. 199 But in explaining how
courts should decide which expectations of privacy are reasonable ones,
the Rakas Court appeared to take a large step back in time to the understandings that Jones and Katz sought to supplant when the only normative sources it offered for determinations of reasonableness were "concepts of real or personal property. " 200 Noting that the defendant did not
own the car itself and failed to claim ownership of the seized items, the
Court concluded that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the

196. Indeed, in the two other major standing cases that reached the Supreme Court
between 1960 (the year of the Jones decision) and Earl Warren's retirement in 1969, the
Warren Court found for the defendants on the standing issue, citing Jones each time,
even when the Jones holding did not control the disposition of these later cases. See
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368, 370 (1968) (holding that a union official had
standing to challenge the removal of documents from his office); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (holding that a homeowner had standing to object to
the electronic surveillance of conversations emanating from his home, even though he
was not a party to the conversations).
197. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
198. 439 U.S. at 142.
199. See 439 U.S. at 143; supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
200. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12. The Court acknowledged that reasonable expectations of privacy need not always be based upon property rights, but it failed to identify any other source to which courts might refer in making a determination of standing.
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search and seizure. Four years later in Rawlings v. Kentucky,2° 1 however, the Court further narrowed the possible grounds for asserting
standing when it held that mere ownership of an item seized - the very
claim that the Court noted Rakas had failed to make - was, in any
event, insufficient by itself to establish a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
And in a companion case to Rawlings, the Court dealt its final
blow to Jones when it overruled the automatic standing rule for possessory offenses. Noting that the Warren Court's decision precluding the
use of a defendant's pretrial suppression hearing testimony to establish
the defendant's guilt at trial vitiated the concerns raised by the Jones
Court,202 the Court in United States v. Salvuccz'203 relied on the reasoning
of its decision in Rawlings to conclude that mere possession of a seized
item was simply not "a substitute for a factual finding that the owner of
the good had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
searched. " 204 This time the Court was completely silent about normative
sources for "legitimate" privacy expectations, merely remanding the
case to the lower courts. But Rakas, Rawlings, and Salvucci together
suggested implicitly that only full authority to exclude others from the
place searched, regardless of any possessory interests the defendant
might have in the things seized, would suffice for standing.205 Thus, by
1980, the Court not only had explicitly overturned both of the standing
rules announced in Jones, but it also appeared to have replaced them
with an exceedingly narrow and formalistic test, closely tied to
common-law understandings of property rights, for assessing "the reasonable" or "legitimate" privacy interests that give rise to Fourth
Amendment standing.
Ten years later, the Court backtracked somewhat from this extreme
position when it reaffirmed the specific holding in Jones, though it continued to reject Jones' categorical standing rules. In Minnesota v.

201. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (holding that the defendant
had no standing to contest the search of his companion's purse and the seizure of drugs
found therein, despite his admitted possessory interest in the drugs themselves).
202. See supra note 193-94 and accompanying text.
203. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
204. 448 U.S. at 92. The Salvucci Court left open, however, the question whether
a defendant's pretrial suppression testimony could be used to impeach the defendant's
trial testimony. Although the Supreme Court has not answered this question yet, most
lower federal and state courts permit such impeachment. See Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance, 14 CAL. L. REv. 1567,
1644 n.253 (1986) (citing cases).
205. See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105 (using "right to exclude others" language);
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (same).
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Olson206 the Court held that the defendant had standing to contest his
warrantless arrest in an apartment that he did not own, but in which he
stayed as an overnight guest. Rejecting the state's (understandable, in
light of the Court's previous cases) position that the defendant lacked
standing because he lacked the right to exclude others from the apartment, the Court held that overnight guests possess reasonable expectations of privacy for their persons and their possessions207 while in the
home of another. In deeming these expectations "reasonable," the
Court appeared to rely not upon traditional attributes of property ownership, but rather upon the recognition that the harboring of overnight
guests in the home is a "longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society. " 208 Whether Olson represents
merely an special exception for expectations of privacy in homes because of the special nature of activities conducted there209 or whether it
also might suggest that· individuals in cars or other less protected areas
also might have expectations of privacy despite their inability to exclude others, remains an open question.210 But even with Olson's expansion of the potential sources for reasonable expectations of privacy, the
post-Rakas standing regime still remains much stricter than the truly expansive standing doctrine formulated by the Warren Court in Jones.
The strictness of the current standing regime makes it much more
likely that cases will arise in which law enforcement agents can exploit
the fact that the "target" of their investigation will lack standing to
contest searches and seizures designed to obtain evidence against him

206. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
207. See 495 U.S. at 99 ("From the overnight guest's perspective, he seeks shelter
in another's home precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where he and
his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows
inside.") (emphasis added).
208. 495 U.S. at 98.
209. See 495 U.S. at 99 ("We are at our most vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own safety or the security of our belongings.").
210. The year before its decision in Olson, the Court had declined to review, over
a vehement dissent from denial of certiorari by Justice White (who later authored the
Olson opinion), a decision by the Second Circuit holding that a defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his own property that was found under the floor mat
of the car in which he was a passenger. See Paulino v. United States, 490 U.S. 1052
(1989). The pre-Olson Court had made clear that neither mere legitimate presence on
the premises searched nor mere ownership of the item seized can alone establish standing. But Olson demonstrates that, at least in the limited context of overnight house
guests, the two together can be sufficient It now remains an open question whether the
Olson holding has implications outside the home. If it does, then the holding in R<ikas
itself might be undermined. But it is simply too early to tell whether Olson is merely an
exception to the very strict standing regime established by R<ikas, Rawlings, and
Salvucci, or whether it substantially re-orients standing law.
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or her. This possibility was illustrated dramatically by the facts of
United States v. Payner2 11 decided the same year as Rawlings and
Salvucci. In Payner government agents burglarized a bank officer's hotel room in order to obtain the defendant's financial records, which
were located in the bank officer's briefcase. The agents had been instructed that the defendant would lack standing to object to the blatantly
illegal search, and thus they made a deliberate choice to exploit the gap
in enforcement of Fourth Amendment standards created by the standing
requirement.212 Faced with such flagrant disregard of the Constitution,
but lacking the power to apply the exclusionary rule because of standing doctrine, the District Court invoked its inherent "supervisory
power" to exclude the illegally seized evidence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that whatever inherent "supervisory power" the federal courts may have to address
willful violations of a defendant's rights, they lack the power to address
violations, however egregious, of the constitutional rights of a third
party not before the court as a defendant. Such a limitation on the supervisory power of the federal courts - identical to the standing requirement of the Fourth Amendment itself - is necessary, the Court
reasoned, because of "the considerable harm [to truth-seeking] that
would flow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule. " 213
Payner was the first of several opinions in the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts cabining the exercise of supervisory power by federal courts in
criminal cases.214 These decisions together reflect the view of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts that the federal courts have no inherent power
to mandate either:
(1) the adoption of standards that go beyond constitutional minimums in
an effort to provide clear-cut and easily administered prohibitions applicable to federal trial courts or prosecutors or (2) the adoption of broader
remedies than are constitutionally or statutorily mandated in order to
more effectively deter violations of constitutional or statutory prohibitions by federal officials.21s
211. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
212. The District Court in Payner found as a matter of fact that "the Government
affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits
them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual in
order to obtain evidence against third parties, who are the real targets of the governmental intrusion." United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 132-33 (N.D. Ohio 1977),
affd., 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979), revd., 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
213. Payner, 441 U.S. at 734.
214. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983); Bank of Nova Scotia v.
United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988); United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
215. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 35, § 1.5, at 31 n.3.
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This narrow view of supervisory power is quite different from the ringing appeals made in early Warren Court opinions to the duty of federal
judges "to see that the waters of justice are not polluted, " 216 and it, not
surprisingly, has led to fewer exercises of supervisory power in the
post-Warren Court era.217 Thus, the gap in the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule opened by the strict standing doctrine of the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts has been maintained and reinforced by the contemporaneous narrowing of the scope of federal courts' supervisory power.
In addition to transforming the Warren Court's standing doctrine,
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts either generated or expanded a number of other exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Although each of these other exceptions has its own distinct history and
rationale, they all share a similar structure: the Court has permitted the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
when the deterrent effect of exclusion in such circumstances would be,
in the Court's calculus, either negligible or outweighed by the substantial costs to society of suppressing reliable evidence of guilt. Unlike the
Court's reworking of standing doctrine, which was not explicitly tied to
- and indeed was in some tension with - the deterrence rationale for
the exclusionary rule, the rest of the significant exceptions to exclusion
all were promulgated with the explicit purpose of obtaining optimal deterrence. Whether or not one agrees with the Court's calculus, it is apparent that the sum of the exceptions generated in the name of finetuning deterrence has created a Fourth Amendment enforcement regime
quite different from the one imagined by the Warren Court in Mapp and
the early post-Mapp days.
One of the principal exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is the so-called "good-faith exception" for searches and
seizures made in "good-faith" reliance on a judicial warrant that turns
out to be invalid. In such cases, there can be no question that the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated, because the
216. Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956). See also Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (maintaining that their supervisory power prevents the
federal courts from being "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution
they are sworn to uphold").
217. See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM.
L. REv. 1433, 1455 (1984) ("[T]he Burger Court has employed supervisory authority
less frequently than its predecessors."); Robert M. Bloom, Judicial Integrity: A Call for
Its Re-Emergence in the Adjudication of Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 462, 474-75 (1993) ("[T]he present Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the
use of supervisory powers should be curtailed."); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 148 n.265 (1995) ("Lately ... the Court has been hostile to
the expansive use of supervisory powers by lower courts.").
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defendant was subject to a search or a seizure for which, in fact, there
was no probable cause,218 or because the warrant was invalid in some
other constitutionally significant way (such as by failing to meet the requirement that warrants be supported "by Oath or affirmation" or that
they "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized").219 But if the law enforcement agent executing
the warrant can demonstrate that it was objectively reasonable to rely
on the warrant - that is, that the agents applying for the warrant did
not mislead the issuing magistrate, that the issuing magistrate was not
clearly biased, and that neither the affidavit nor the warrant itself was
so patently lacking in constitutional sufficiency that reliance on it would
be "entirely unreasonable" 220 - the evidence seized by the agent will
be admitted, even if a reviewing court finds the warrant to be, in fact,
constitutionally invalid. While the Court recognized that the "goodfaith" exception represented a departure from its prior applications of
the exclusionary rule,221 it also noted that it had "frequently questioned
whether the exclusionary rule can have any deterrent effect when the
offending officers acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their
conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment. " 222 Reasoning that the
purpose of evidentiary exclusion was to deter police misconduct, rather
than mistakes by the magistrates and judges who issue warrants, the
Court concluded that "the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a
subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial
costs of exclusion. " 223
On a practical level, the good-faith exception represents a substantial break with Warren Court implementation of the exclusionary rule:
no longer can criminal defendants, even those with "standing," litigate
the constitutional sufficiency of warrants absent the extreme circum218. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary rule should not apply to a search made in good-faith reliance on a warrant that
was, in the eyes of reviewing courts, unsupported by probable cause).
·
219. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (holding that the
exclusionary rule should not apply to a search warrant that was technically defective because it failed to describe the items to be seized, where the accompanying affidavit did
contain such a description).
220. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)).
221. See 468 U.S. at 915-16 (noting that, prior to its decision in Leon, the Court
had "simply excluded such evidence [that was seized in reliance on a warrant that turns
out to be invalid] without considering whether Fourth Amendment interests will be
advanced").
222. 468 U.S. at 918.
223. 468 U.S. at 922.
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stances identified by the Leon Court that would render reliance· upon
them objectively unreasonable. On a theoretical level, the exception reflects a narrow view of the deterrent scope of the rule, a broad view of
its costs, and a rejection of any rationale for evidentiary exclusion other
than the balancing of deterrent benefits against social costs. As for deterrence, Leon rejected both the idea that magistrates and judges fell
within the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule224 and the notion that
the exclusionary sanction would deter police misconduct by promoting
institutional compliance with the Fourth Amendment by affecting the
training and monitoring of law enforcement agents in their applications
for and execution of warrants.225 On the cost side, Leon reiterated the
concern of a long line of Burger Court opinions that evidentiary exclusion can " 'impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge
and jury' " 226 and thus may " 'generat[e] disrespect for the law and administration of justice.' " 227 Most significant, Leon represents the triumph of the Burger Court's cost-benefit approach to the application of
the exclusionary rule, which would later be embraced by the Rehnquist
Court as well. Justice Brennan's dissent in Leon is one of the last statements of the Warren Court view, present in Mapp itself, that exclusion
of evidence is necessary not only to deter police misconduct but also to
promote what the Mapp Court called "judicial integrity." 228 Just as the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts rejected, in the supervisory-power context,
the Warren Court's concern about "polluting the waters of justice, " 229
the later Courts also rejected the idea that the exclusionary rule should

224. See 468 U.S. at 917 ("Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly
to deter them."). The Court expanded this idea a bit in Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct.
1185 (1995), when it held that an officer's reliance on a clerical mistake by a courthouse employee also fell outside the proper scope of the exclusionary rule because
courthouse personnel, like magistrates and judges, have no stake in the outcomes of
criminal trials and thus are unlikely to be deterred from error by the exclusion of
evidence.
225. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 (finding "speculative" arguments that suppression
of evidence seized pursuant to judicial warrants would either deter inadequate affidavits
and "magistrate shopping" or encourage officers to scrutinize more closely warrants
that were issued to them in order to point out judicial errors).
226. 468 U.S. at 907 (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)).
227. 468 U.S. at 908 (alteration in original) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 491 (1976)).
228. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
229. See Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956); supra text accompanying notes 213-17.
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be used " 'to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude.' " 230 Rather, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts would seek to use the exclusionary rule
only when, in their view, the benefits in deterrence of police misconduct outweighed the costs in harm to truth-seeking of the exclusion of
evidence.
This calculus not only led to the good-faith exception as it now exists, it also may yet lead to a potentially much larger exception to the
exclusionary rule. The rationale offered for the result in Leon - that
the exclusionary rule is unlikely to deter "when the offending officers
acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment" 231 - could apply, in theory, to any police
action performed in "good faith" and not merely to police reliance on
judicial warrants. Such a generalized good-faith exception would create
a great deal of litigation to define its scope, requiring courts to develop,
case by case, new conceptions about what kinds of mistakes would be
"objectively reasonable" for the police to make in the field. Perhaps for
this reason the Court has evaded up to this point government requests
that it generalize the existing good-faith exception,232 while at the same
time clearly leaving that option open. But the Court soon may be forced
to decide the issue, given that the House of Representatives, as part of
its "Contract With America," passed a bill requiring the admission of
evidence in federal courts when that evidence is obtained by law enforcement agents who have a "reasonable" but wrong belief in the constitutionality of their conduct.233 Should some such provision pass both
houses of Congress and become law, it seems inevitable that the Supreme Court would review its constitutionality. If a generalized goodfaith exception were upheld and interpreted expansively, the Court
could achieve through a reworking of constitutional remedy what it has
been unwilling to accomplish directly through a reworking of constitutional right - the establishment of a general standard of "reasonableness" as the governing enforceable Fourth Amendment norm. Thus,
Leon may do more than establish its already significant good-faith exception for reliance on judicial warrants; broadly construed, it may end
up resetting the standard to which law enforcement agents will be held
230. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 (quoting Payner, 447 U.S. at 734).
231. 468 U.S. at 918.
232. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1194 n.5 (1995) (declining to
decide the merits of the Solicitor General's suggestion, as amicus curiae, that the goodfaith exception should be generalized to include all police action taken in good faith,
whether or not authorized by warrant).
233. See H.R. 666, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The drafters of the bill relied
explicitly on the Supreme Court's reasoning in the Leon case. See H.R. REP. No. 17,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7, 10-13 (1995).

August 1996]

Counter-Revolution?

2515

in their conduct by enforcing through evidentiary exclusion not the current Fourth Amendment norms, but rather a "reasonable" approximation of those norms.
The same kind of cost-benefit analysis used in Leon also led the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts to create exceptions to the exclusionary
rule by narrowing the category of evidence that will be deemed the
"fruit" of primary Fourth Amendment violations. It is true that the
Warren Court itself acknowledged that not all evidence that is connected by a causal chain to some primary illegality is "fruit of the poisonous tree." In Wong Sun v. United States234 the Court recognized that,
at some point, the causal chain of connection between a Fourth Amendment violation and evidence that "would not have come to light but for
the illegal actions of the police" 235 may become " 'so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint.' " 236 But in the decades that followed, the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts consistently narrowed the "fruits" doctrine to exempt entire categories of evidence from the exclusionary rule. Each
time, the Court either questioned the likely deterrent effect on police
misconduct of excluding the category of evidence before it, or relied on
the importance of that evidence to the truth-seeking process, or both.
In three different fruits cases, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts expressed skepticism that exempting categories of evidence from the fruits
doctrine would create perverse incentives for the police. First, in Nix v.
Williams237 the Court explicitly endorsed the "inevitable-discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule, holding that evidence that the police
obtain as a result of illegal conduct238 is nonetheless admissible in court
if the government can show that it "inevitably" would have discovered
the evidence by lawful means. If the evidence "inevitably" would have
come to light, reasoned the Court, it is not really the "fruit" of the illegal police action, and suppressing it thus would create a windfall to the
defendant by putting the government in a worse position than it would
have been in had the illegality never occurred.239 The Court explicitly

234. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
235. 371 U.S. at 488.
236. 371 U.S. at 487 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939)).
237. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
238. In Williams the illegal conduct was a Sixth Amendment Massiah violation,
but it is clear that the Court meant its holding to apply to constitutional violations
generally.
239. See 467 U.S. at 443 (explaining that "the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse,
position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred").
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rejected the holding of the Iowa Supreme Court, adopted by the Eighth
Circuit on habeas review in the Williams case, that the "inevitablediscovery" exception should be available to the government only when
it can demonstrate that the police did not act in "bad faith" in obtaining
the evidence.240 The Eighth Circuit had argued that in the absence of
such a limitation, "the temptation to risk deliberate violations of the
[Constitution] would be too great, and the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule reduced too far. " 241 The Supreme Court stated simply that
"[w]e reject that view," explaining that police officers rarely will be in
a position to exploit in a calculating fashion the "inevitable-discovery"
exception announced in Williams, and in those rare occasions, "the possibility of departmental discipline and civil liability" should suffice to
fill in the gap in deterrence created by the exception.242
Second, in Murray v. United States243 the Court expanded the already established "independent-source" exception to the exclusionary
rule, which permitted the government to use evidence that otherwise
would be tainted by unconstitutional conduct if the government could
establish that the evidence was obtained from a source wholly independent of the illegal action. In Murray the Court held that the exception
applied even when the very same law enforcement agents who performed an illegal, warrantless search later came back and performed a
legal search with a warrant based on probable cause established with
facts known to the police prior to the first, illegal search.244 Once again,
the Court simply rejected the fears of the dissenters that the Murray
holding would give police officers incentive to conduct warrantless
searches when they had what they believed to be strong probable cause,
thus seeking to confirm their suspicions before bothering to obtain a
24-0. See 467 U.S. at 445-46. While the vast majority of both state and federal
courts to consider the issue recognized the existence of an "inevitable-discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule before the Supreme Court fonnally announced one in
Nix v. Williams, a number of states in addition to Iowa had limited the exception by imposing a requirement that the government prove lack of "bad faith." See Fain v. State,
611 S.W.2d 508 (Ark. 1981); People v. Superior Ct. of Alameda County, 145 Cal. Rptr.
795 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Holler, 459 A.2d 1143 (N.H. 1983); State v. Adams,
No. 83-CA-25, 1983 WL 2587 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1983).
241. Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.5 (8th Cir. 1983), revd., 467 U.S. 431
(1984).
242. Williams, 461 U.S. at 445, 446.
243. 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
244. See 487 U.S. at 541-42 & n.3. The federal agents in Murray suspected that
the defendants were storing marijuana in a warehouse. Without obtaining a warrant or
establishing the existence of any exception to the warrant requirement, they searched
the warehouse, discovering the suspected marijuana. At that point, the agents obtained a
search warrant, based on an affidavit stating only the facts as known to them prior to
the illegal search, which the judicial officer found to constitute probable cause.
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search warrant. 245 Instead, the Court merely asserted that police officers
would be loath to take on the "onerous burden" of demonstrating to a
court that the warrant was not tainted by the earlier illegal search.246 In
doing so, the Court ignored the fact that the testimony of the officers
themselves would be the only possible source of evidence on the question of taint and thus that the Murray rule created an opportunity for
those officers inclined to commit perjury to do so persuasively - with
the information obtained by illegal search in hand.241
Finally, in New York v. Harris, 248 in a brief and rather obscure
opinion, the Court held that a stationhouse statement taken from a suspect after he was arrested illegally in his home by the police without a
warrant, although with probable cause, was not a "fruit" of the unlawful arrest. The Court reasoned that the statement was neither the "product" nor an " 'exploitation' " of the illegal home invasion because the
requirement of an arrest warrant in addition to probable cause to arrest
merely protects the privacy of the home from invasion and not the
defendant himself from lawful custody and interrogation.249 Despite
strong evidence that the police in Harris were motivated to violate the
Payton rule250 that requires warrants for home arrests in order to obtain
a statement from the defendant - because New York state law required
that defendants arrested upon a warrant be provided with counsel at the
time of any subsequent questioning, thus rendering the likelihood of a
statement virtually nil251 - the Court insisted that suppressing a stationhouse statement taken after a warrantless home arrest "will have little effect on the officers' actions." 252
In Williams, Murray, and Harris, there was, consecutively, more
and more reason to think that the Court's holding might create perverse
incentives for law enforcement agents to knowingly violate Fourth
245. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L.
R.Ev. 881, 933-34 (1991) (explaining why police officers with solid probable cause may
be given incentive under the Murray rule to search illegally first and seek a warrant
later).
246. Murray, 487 U.S. at 540.
247. See Stuntz, supra note 245, at 934 (arguing that if one purpose of the warrant
requirement is to combat police perjury by requiring the police to swear to a version of
the facts before searching so that they will not be able to tailor their testimony to the
facts that the search reveals, Murray creates exactly the incentives that the majority
opinion denies).
248. 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
249. 495 U.S. at 19 (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)).
250. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
251. See Harris, 495 U.S. at 25 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing N.Y. CRIM.
PRoc. LAW§ 120.20 (McKinney 1981) and People v. Samuels, 400 N.E.2d 1344 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1980)).
252. 495 U.S. at 21.
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Amendment norms. And in each case, more and more Justices dissented
on just such grounds. 253 But in each case, the majority of the Court continued on the course charted in Leon of taking a narrow view of "adequate" deterrence of official misconduct. Essentially, the Court maintained that as long as. there remained some deterrent in the law to
unlawful police action - whether it be the civil remedies the Court alluded to in Williams, or the continuing risk that some evidence would
be subject to suppression,254 or some combination of the two - the cost
of excluding reliable evidence of guilt outweighed the benefits of increased deterrence. In other "fruits" cases, the Court sounded Leon's
parallel theme of concern about the cost to the truth-seeking process of
exclusion of evidence. For example, in United States v. Ceccolini, 255 the
Court held that a witness discovered as the result of an illegal search256
was not the "fruit" of that search in light of other factors "attenuating"
the taint of the search, such as the witness's voluntariness in cooperating with the government investigation.257 But the Court relied in large
part on the high cost to the trial process of "permanently silencing" a
live witness as a sanction for an illegal search.258 The post-Warren
Court "fruits" cases, taken as a whole, demonstrate how the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts' cost-benefit calculus - weighted more sympathetically on the cost side than the benefit side - led to the development of
substantial exceptions to the operation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
The development of the "impeachment" exception to the exclusionary rule tells essentially the same story. As in the "fruits" context,
the Warren Court itself recognized a limited exception to the exclusionary rule: in Walder v. United States, 259 the Court permitted the use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach a testifying defendant's credibility
as a witness at his own criminal trial. But the Walder exception was a
253. Williams had two dissenters, Mu"ay had three, and Harris had four.
254. The Court explicitly noted that any statement or physical evidence obtained
inside the home during a warrantless home arrest would continue to be subject to suppression after Ha"is and thus would continue to deter adequately such warrantless arrests. See 495 U.S. at 20.
255. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
256. A government agent illegally opened an envelope he observed on the counter
of the defendant's flower shop, discovering betting slips inside. As a result, one of the
employees of the shop became a witness against the defendant. See 435 U.S. at 270-73.
257. 435 U.S. at 279-80.
258. 435 U.S. at 280; see also United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 & n.20
(1980) (emphasizing the grossly disproportionate windfall that would accrue to a
defendant if his presence at trial were deemed a "fruit" of the unlawful seizure of his
person).
259. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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narrow one on its facts and its reasoning. The defendant in Walder was
impeached on a matter collateral to the issue of his ultimate guilt or innocence of the charge at hand and in response to a patently fa1se statement he offered during his direct examination by his own counsel.260
The Walder Court emphasized the egregious nature of the defendant's
perjury in justifying its exception to the exclusionary rule, noting that
the defendant "must be free to deny a11 the elements of the case against
him" without fear of impeachment with illegally obtained evidence.261
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts, however, took Walder and ran
with it, using the same cost-benefit ana1ysis to expand drastically the
scope of the impeachment exception. fu United States v. Havens262 the
Court managed to set aside every limiting aspect of the Warren Court's
decision in Walder. First, unlike Wa1der, Havens was impeached not
about a collatera1 matter, but about his denia1 of involvement in the
very charge at issue in his tria1. Thus, the suppressed evidence used to
impeach Havens was much more likely than the evidence used against
Wa1der to be considered by the fact finder as substantive evidence of
the defendant's guilt, as opposed to evidence only of his lack of credibility as a witness.263 Second, unlike Walder's statements, the statements
by Havens that were impeached by the suppressed evidence were elicited not by Haven's own counsel, but by the government on crossexamination of Havens after Havens gave a genera] denia1 of the
charges on direct. By approving the use of suppressed evidence to impeach denia1s elicited on cross, the Havens Court effectively obliterated
the assurance of the Walder Court that a defendant "must be free to
deny a11 elements of the case against him." fu light of the generally
broad rules governing the proper scope of cross-examination, it is
highly likely that a genera] denia1 by a defendant will elicit proper
cross-examination by the government regarding relevant suppressed
evidence.
The Havens holding clearly makes suppressed evidence more va1uable to the government because such evidence will now genera1ly be

260. Walder testified on direct examination that he never had purchased, sold, or
possessed illegal narcotics. The Court upheld the government's impeachment of this
statement with evidence that heroin had been seized, albeit in violation of the constitution, from the defendant two years earlier. See 347 U.S. at 63-64.
261. 347 U.S. at 65.
262. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
263. In Havens the defendant's denial of participation in narcotics trafficking was
impeached with a T-shirt illegally seized from his luggage, from which swatches had
been cut. The swatches had been used to make "pockets" in the undershirt of the
defendant's travelling companion for the transportation of cocaine. See 446 U.S. at 62223.
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admissible whenever a defendant talces the stand, thus forcing the defense to choose between allowing the defendant to testify and ensuring
that constitutionally suppressed evidence stays out of the trial. But once
again, the Court was skeptical that its new holding would create substantial incentives to disregard Fourth Amendment norms. The Court
concluded that precluding Havens-type impeachment of defendants with
suppressed evidence would have only an "incremental" deterrent effect
on police misconduct, given that the government still is precluded from
using such evidence in its case-in-chief.264 Moreover, the Court once
again found more powerful the need to further truth-seeking by combatting defendants' perjury than the need for deterrence by applying the
exclusionary rule.
The greatest possible expansion of the impeachment exception was
rejected by the Court in 1990 when, in James v. Illinois, 265 the Court
held that only the defendant himself and not other defense witnesses
could be impeached with suppressed evidence.266 In essence, the Court
refused to convert the idea of impeachment of the credibility of the
defendant-as-witness into a general right to rebut the defense case with
further evidence of the defendant's guilt. The opinion, one of the last
written for the Court by Justice Brennan before his retirement, sounds
themes at odds with those present in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts'
other impeachment cases and, indeed, their exclusionary rule cases generally. Interestingly, Justice Brennan adopted for the purposes of the
James opinion exactly the cost-benefit analysis he had bemoaned in earlier dissents, most notably his lengthy dissent in Leon. But Justice
Brennan's opinion in James shows that cost-benefit analysis has no inherent tilt against application of the exclusionary rule; any tilt comes
from the weights assigned to the inevitably unquantifiable costs and
benefits. The James majority saw a great deal of deterrent benefit to
precluding the impeachment of defense witnesses with constitutionally
suppressed evidence: a contrary rule, feared the Court, would make
such evidence much more valuable to the government and thus would
create an unacceptable incentive for the police to violate the Fourth
Amendment. And the James majority was correspondingly unimpressed
with the "cost" of permitting defense witnesses to subvert the truthseeking process by misrepresenting facts with impunity from impeachment, noting that the threat of prosecution for perjury should deter most
mendacious defense witnesses.
264. 446 U.S. at 627.
265. 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
266. fu James, the suppressed evidence was a statement taken from the defendant
after his arrest without probable cause. See 493 U.S. at 309-10.
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It might seem that James is a challenge to my thesis of "counterrevolution" in decision rules, as it holds the line against a potentially
powerful exception to the exclusionary rule. But James is remarkable
mostly because it is so anomalous in the otherwise gross expansion of
the impeachment exception. And even more important, James was a 5-4
decision in which four of the five members of the majority have since
retired and been replaced,267 while all four dissenters remain on the
Court. Moreover, the Court has already overruled two other 5-4
Brennan majority opinions issued the same year as James (and
Brennan's last year on the Court).268 Thus, James in the impeachment
context, like Leon in the generalized "good-faith" context, signals the
possibility of even more massive change in decision rules on the
horizon.
When the strands are considered together, the web of exceptions to
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule created by simultaneous
changes in the doctrines relating to standing, the good-faith exception,
fruits, and impeachment represents a complete reworking of the exclusionary rule regime that existed during the 1960s - the post-Mapp
Warren Court era. Our hypothetical conscientious list-maker attempting
to chart when Fourth Amendment violations will lead to evidentiary exclusion would be compelled to create two very different lists in 1969
and 1996. The practical and conceptual differences between these two
lists present some of the strongest evidence supporting those who argue
that there has been a "counter-revolution" in constitutional criminal
procedure in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.
Marked as the changes in the scope of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule may be, the changes in Fifth Amendment decision rules
are, if anything, even more dramatic. At first blush, it is hard to see
how there could be any meaningful distinction in the Fifth Amendment
context between "conduct" rules and "decision" rules. While it is quite
plausible to claim that the Fourth Amendment "has" an exclusionary
rule created by the courts that is a decision rule separate from the
Amendment's substantive conduct rules relating to reasonableness, warrants, and probable cause, it is important to see that the Fifth Amendment "is" an exclusionary rule. The very "conduct" prohibited by the
amendment is the "decision" by courts to admit compelled testimony
from the accused against him or her at trial. Police practices that com267. Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun have been replaced by Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsberg, and Breyer.
268. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by
Adarand Contractors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct 2097 (1995); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S.
508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
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pel an accused to speak do not themselves violate the Fifth Amendment269 unless and until they are used "in a criminal case. " 270
One of the most striking changes wrought by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts has been the transformation of the Miranda decision from
an interpretation of the.Fifth Amendment itself into a subconstitutional,
prophylactic rule whose violation is not necessarily an infringement of
constitutional right. By reconceiving Miranda in this way, the later
Courts were able to dispense with the absolute rule of exclusion that inheres in the Fifth Amendment itself and to portray Miranda as "having" an exclusionary rule subject to the same sorts of vicissitudes as the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
The reconceptualization began early. In 1974 in Michigan v.
Tucker,271 the Court held that the government could call at trial a witness whose identity was obtained from a defendant who was interrogated by the police in violation of Miranda's dictates at a time prior to
Miranda's decision by the Court.272 The Court's opinion relied heavily
on the unusual facts of the case - that the police action predated the
Miranda decision, that the police nonetheless complied in large part
with Miranda's dictates (failing only to tell the defendant that an attorney would be appointed for him if he could not afford one), and that
only the identity of a witness was obtained and used from the interrogation of the defendant. While the Tucker decision is thus of little precedential value on its facts, it is the first case in which the Court clearly
characterized the Miranda decision as less than a straight-forward interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, explained that the procedures mandated by
Miranda were not part of the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination but rather were merely "prophylactic rules developed to
protect that right. " 273 As a result, reasoned the Court, disregard of Miranda's prophylactic rules did not require automatic exclusion of all
fruits the way a "real" Fifth Amendment violation would. Rather, the
Court characterized the question before it as "how sweeping the judicially imposed consequences of this disregard shall be. " 274

269. At least, such practices do not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
They may well violate the Due Process Clause.
270. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
271. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
272. Miranda's dictates applied to the case because the trial occurred after the decision was handed down. See 417 U.S. at 435.
273. 417 U.S. at 439.
274. 417 U.S. at 445.
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This characterization of Miranda in effect created a conduct
rule/decision rule distinction in the heretofore unitary Fifth Amendment
context. In the wake of Tucker, it became clear that while the Constitution required police to seek to comply with Miranda's prophylactic conduct rules, failures to comply would not necessarily result in the exclusion of all fruits of such violations. Rather, the scope of Miranda's
decision rules was a matter for the Court to determine on a case by case
basis. And in making such a determination, the Court found itself
guided by exactly the calculus it had created in the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule context: it sought to weigh the deterrent effect of excluding evidence against " 'society's interest in the effective prosecution of criminals' " through the admission of reliable evidence of
guilt.21s
Having created some space between Miranda's conduct rules and
its decision rules, the Court soon pared down the Miranda exclusionary
rule in ways essentially parallel to its cutbacks of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Standing rarely comes up as an issue in the
Fifth Amendment context because a defendant usually has standing to
contest the use of his or her own statements or their fruits, and the government generally is precluded from using the out-of-court statements
of others as evidence against a defendant by the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. But a "goodfaith" exception of sorts made a brief appearance in the Fifth Amendment context in Tucker itself. The Tucker Court explained that, for police interrogations that occurred prior to the Court's decision in
Miranda, it would not make sense to exclude the fruits of interrogations
that did not comply with Miranda's detailed strictures unless at least
some negligence could be shown on the part of the interrogating officers: " [w]here the official action was pursued in complete good faith
. . . the deterrence rationale loses much of its force." 276 This "goodfaith" exception appears to be limited to cases of police action that antedated the Miranda opinion; given that the dictates of Miranda are so
excruciatingly clear, there is little room for police officers to claim
"good-faith" lack of compliance in post-Miranda interrogations.
The doctrines relating to "fruits" and impeachment, however, have
proven to be the major growth areas in exceptions to Miranda's exclusionary rule. Tucker was really the first Miranda fruits case because
Tucker sought to suppress the testimony of a witness whose identity
275. 417 U.S. at 450 (quoting Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 221 (1969)). Indeed, the Tucker Court made the parallel to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence explicit
See 417 U.S. at 446-47.
276. 417 U.S. at 447.
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was obtained as a result of Tucker's interrogation in violation of
Miranda. But it was unclear what the reach of Tucker might be beyond
its unusual facts. In Oregon v. Elstad, 277 however, the Court reiterated
Tucker's characterization of Miranda as a "prophylactic" rule278 and
held that a statement obtained after waiver of rights from a properly
warned defendant need not be suppressed as a "fruit" of an earlier, unwarned statement obtained by the police from the defendant in violation
of Miranda. The Court explained that Miranda violations create merely
a "presumption of compulsion" 279 that, while it is conclusive as to the
admissibility of the defendant's statements in the government's case-inchief, can be rebutted for other purposes by a showing that the unwarned confession was not actually "coerced" in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. If the government can make such a showing, reasoned the
Court, there is no need to suppress evidence derived from the defendant's statements, because this evidence is not really the "fruit" of any
true constitutional violation. The Elstad Court's analysis would seem to
have applicability to any possible "fruits" of Miranda violations and
not merely the second statement scenario presented in Elstad itself.280
Indeed, many state and lower federal courts have read it to mean that
Miranda violations simply produce no suppressible "fruits" at all. 281
Thus, the Court's "fruits" analysis in the Miranda context is even
more radically restrictive than its Fourth Amendment "fruits" analysis.
In the Fourth Amendment context, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
limited the category of suppressible fruits either by expanding existing
exceptions (like the "independent-source" doctrine) or by creating new
ones (like the "inevitable-discovery" doctrine or the rule in New York v.
Harris). But in the Fifth Amendment context, the Court moved from an
understanding of Miranda as an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment
that would require the automatic exclusion of all derivative evidence to
an understanding of Miranda as a mere prophylactic rule that requires
the exclusion of nothing except the unwarned statement itself.
This same conception of Miranda as a prophylactic rule of subconstitutional status also led the Court to create a large exception to
Miranda's exclusionary rule under the rubric of impeachment. The set277. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
278. 470 U.S. at 305.
279. 470 U.S. at 307.
280. For example, a defendant's statement can lead to witnesses, as in Tucker, or
to physical evidence by creating probable cause to search.
281. See David A. Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear
Fruit?, 53 Omo ST. L.J. 805, 811 & n.18 (1992) ("[F]ederal and state courts have read
[Elstad] broadly to mean that the poisonous tree doctrine is inapplicable when a
Miranda violation produces any derivative evidence.") (citing cases).
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tled understanding of the Fifth Amendment, which has continued to be
accepted by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, is that statements that
truly are "compelled" from a defendant in violation of the Fifth
Amendment cannot be used even to impeach the defendant's credibility
if the defendant testifies contrary to such statements at trial. To do so
would make the defendant a "witness against himself" against the clear
textual command of the Fifth Amendment.282 But once the post-Warren
Court defined statements taken in violation of Miranda not as truly
"compelled," it found itself freed from the textual mandate of exclusion and thus able to treat Miranda's requirement of exclusion of statements that would be deemed "voluntary" under the old Fifth Amendment as a judicially created remedy subject to the same cost-benefit
analysis as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Dismissing as
dicta language of the Miranda decision that indicated that statements
taken in violation of its dictates may not be used at trial at all, the Court
held, as it had in the Fourth Amendment context, that the costs in encouragement of perjury outweighed the benefits of any additional deterrence of police misconduct that would be obtained by forbidding impeachment of the defendant, given that the government already was
precluded from using the suppressed evidence in its case-in-chief.283
The Court later extended this holding, which permitted impeachment
with a statement taken when Miranda warnings were not given, to permit impeachment with a statement taken when a defendant invoked his
Miranda right to counsel but the police ignored his request and continued to interrogate him.284 Once again, the Court emphasized that the
"search for truth in a criminal case" 285 outweighed the deterrent effect
of exclusion, despite the obvious incentive for police misconduct inherent in this latter situation.
It is fair to describe as pivotal, indeed, even "counterrevolutionary" the enormous shift from the Warren Court's conception
of Miranda as recognizing the inherent compulsion present in custodial
interrogation and thus interpreting the Fifth Amendment, to the Burger
and Warren Court's interpretation of Miranda as merely preventing
"real" Fifth Amendment violations through a judge-made exclusionary

282. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (holding that the use of
compelled statements to impeach the defendant, even when such statements are clearly
reliable, is impermissible because it violates the Fifth Amendment "in its most pristine
form"); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) (holding that a defendant's involuntary statements may not be used to impeach him in any criminal trial).
283. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
284. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
285. 420 U.S. at 722.
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rule. Yet it is important to note that this reconceptualization entailed no
change at all in police conduct rules - Miranda's requirements in
terms of warnings and waivers remain untouched. Rather, the Miranda
sea-change simply changed the consequences to the government in
terms of evidentiary exclusion that flow from police failures to abide by
Miranda's requirements. It is here in the Miranda context that the contrast between stability in conduct rules and change in decision rules is
the greatest.
The Sixth Amendment Massiah rule, which has enjoyed the most
stability of all of the Warren Court's conduct rules,286 has not been undermined quite as much by decision rules as has Miranda, although the
Court has begun to move in that direction and well may accelerate its
progress soon. For reasons identical to those in the Miranda context,
standing to challenge Massiah violations is rarely an issue because a
defendant always will have standing to object to the admission of his
own statements, and the government rarely will seek to admit the outof-court statements of others against the defendant because of separate
Confrontation Clause concerns. The question of governmental "good
faith" also almost never comes up because Massiah's prohibition of
"deliberate" elicitation of statements in the absence of counsel seems
to contain within it a standard of government culpability. The Supreme
Court has not had occasion to address the issue of what constitutes a
suppressible "fruit" of a Massiah violation, but its treatment of the impeachment question suggests the direction that the Court may take.
In Michigan v. Harvey, 281 the Court held that the Michigan v.
Jackson rule,288 which prohibits any deliberate elicitation of statements
from a defendant after an invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel unless the defendant initiates contact with the police, is a prophylactic rule identical to Fifth Amendment rule in Edwards v. Arizona,289 which prohibits interrogation of suspects after they invoke their
Miranda right to counsel unless the suspect reinitiates contact. The
Court reasoned that when the police violate the Jackson rule by continuing to question a defendant after he has invoked his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel but then obtain a valid waiver of counsel and a statement, they have not violated the Sixth Amendment itself but only a prophylactic rule designed to prevent such violations. 290 Statements obtained in such a fashion thus can be used to impeach a testifying
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See supra notes 33-60 and accompanying text.
494 U.S. 344 (1990).
475 U.S. 625 (1986).
451 U.S. 477 (1981).
See Harvey, 494 U.S. at 351.
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defendant at trial because the harm to the truth-seeking process caused
by a defendant's perjury is greater than the deterrent effect likely to be
obtained by precluding such impeachment.291 The Court explicitly left
open the question, however, whether a "core" Massiah violation that is, a statement obtained from a defendant whose Sixth Amendment
right to counsel has attached and never been waived - is itself a violation of the Sixth Amendment.292 Thus, the Court has left open the door
to concluding that Massiah's ban on questioning in the absence of
counsel after the commencement of adversary proceedings, like Miranda's ban on the questioning of suspects in custody in the absence of
warnings, is not an interpretation of the Constitution, but rather a prophylactic rule designed to sweep more broadly than the actual constitutional right in order to deter police misconduct.
If the Court so concludes, the consequences for the Massiah rule
likely would be very similar to the consequences that have obtained already in the Miranda context. That is, derivative evidence obtained as a
result of a Massiah violation - such as a second statement, the identity
of a witness, or probable cause to seize physical evidence - likely
would not be precluded from use by the government at trial. And statements taken in violation of Massiah likely would be permitted as impeachment against a defendant who testified contrary to such statements
at trial. While the limited impeachment exception that the Court thus far
has permitted in the Sixth Amendment context is not of the same proportion as the changes in decision rules in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts, the Court has set the stage for a re-working of Massiah
that would be equally significant. And even the limited impeachment
exception already recognized by the Court in Harvey represents a
greater change in decision rules in the Massiah context than is apparent
in the completely stable conduct rules created in the Massiah case.

B. Review and Reversal of Convictions
In addition to promulgating "inclusionary rules" that make possible the admission of evidence that has been obtained through unconstitutional conduct of law enforcement agents, the Court also has changed
rules governing the standard of review on appeal of constitutional errors
and governing the availability of federal review of state court convictions. These latter rules are "inclusionary" in a less direct way than are
the former: when the Court makes it harder for constitutional errors to
lead to reversal of convictions and when it shuts the door to federal
291. See 494 U.S. at 353.
292. See 494 U.S. at 353-54.
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postconviction review, the result is that convictions resulting from trials
in which unconstitutionally obtained evidence has been erroneously admitted are left undisturbed by reviewing courts. Thus, these rules, like
the rules directly governing the admission of evidence at trial, permit
the government to reap the evidentiary benefits at trial of prior police
misconduct without incurring any judicially imposed penalty.
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have moved fairly consistently
since the 1960s in the direction of permitting appellate courts to apply
"harmless error" analysis to ever-expanding categories of constitutional
error. It is true that it was the Warren Court that first held that any constitutional error could be deemed harmless, when, in the 1967 case of
Chapman v. California, 293 it held that i;:onstitutional errors that occur in
criminal trials on occasion might be "so unimportant and insignificant"
as to be deemed harmless and thus preclude the need for reversal of the
conviction.294 The Chapman Court, however, also imposed two important limits on its holding. First, the Court concluded that constitutional
errors require as a matter of federal law295 a standard of harmless error
review different from and more demanding than the one used in federal
courts and in most state courts to assess the harmlessness of ordinary,
nonconstitutional error. Instead of asking whether or not the error "affected substantial rights, " 296 courts reviewing constitutional error must
assure themselves that the error is "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt" before permitting the conviction to stand.297 Second, the
Chapman Court noted that some constitutional errors are "so basic to a
fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error" 298
and gave as examples the admission of a coerced confession, the denial
of the right to counsel, and the denial of the right to trial before an impartial judge.299
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts, however, have "dramatically
expanded the list of constitutional violations that are subject to harm293. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
294. 386 U.S. at 22.
295. For a discussion of whether the Chapman standard can be defended as deriving either from the constitution itself or from federal common law, see Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1994).
296. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), established the standard that
reigns in federal court for the assessment of nonconstitutional error: unless a reviewing
court can "say ... with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially
swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected." 328 U.S. at 764-65.
297. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
298. 386 U.S. at 23.
299. See 386 U.S. at 23.
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less-error analysis, while adding few to (and indeed, subtracting one
from) the list of violations that are per se reversible. " 300 For my purposes, what is important to note is that the Court by now has held that
every error relating to the admission of evidence that was obtained by
unconstitutional police conduct can be subject to harmless error review.
The Warren Court itself held, fairly uncontroversially, that Fourth
Amendment violations can be subject to harmless error analysis.301 I say
"fairly uncontroversially" because Fourth Amendment rights relate not
to the conduct of trials at all, but to rights of security from government
intrusion - privacy -that implicate the trial process only indirectly, if
at all.
More controversially, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts went on to
hold that violations of the Massiah rule also may be subject to harmless
error analysis.302 The extension of harmless error analysis to Massiah
violations might be thought to run afoul of Chapman's suggestion that
the right to counsel is one of those rights "so basic to a fair trial that
their infraction can never be treated as harmless." After all, the
Massiah Court had based its proscription of postindictment contact with
a defendant on the Sixth Amendment right to "assistance of counsel."
But the Burger and Rehnquist Courts together effectively have limited
Chapman's special solicitude for the right to counsel to the right. to
counsel at the trial proceeding itself. Even as the Court expanded the
substantive scope of the Massiah right by holding it applicable to a psychiatric interview with a defendant in a capital case,303 the Court simultaneously subjected a violation of the right to harmless error review.304
And the Court also has applied harmless error analysis to the right to
counsel at pretrial identification procedures305 and· preliminary
hearings. 306
Most controversially, the Court in Arizona v. Fulminante301 applied
harmless error analysis to coerced confessions, controverting the explicit understanding of the Chapman Court. Of necessity, Fulminante
also applies to violations of Miranda, which the Court had not yet explicitly subjected to harmless error analysis, though lower federal courts

300. See Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When
Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 10 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1167, 1176 (1995).
301. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
302. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
303. See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988).
304. See 486 U.S. at 258.
305. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977).
306. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
307. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
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had anticipated that it would. 308 Whether or not the Fulminante decision
is a good one,309 it reflects the extent to which the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have diverged from the Warren Court's own understanding
of the scope of constitutional harmless error review.
In addition to expanding the scope of harmless error review of
constitutional violations, the post-Warren Court also moderated the high
standard for assessing constitutional error articulated in Chapman. In
Brecht v. Abrahamson310 the Court held that the standard of "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt" is not generally the proper standard for
federal courts to apply when they review constitutional challenges to
state convictions under their habeas corpus jurisdiction. Instead, the
Court concluded that considerations of federalism and states' interest in
the finality of convictions mandate that the less stringent Kotteakos
standard should apply in most cases.311
Some have suggested that Brecht is not a particularly significant
departure because, in practice, the Kotteakos standard does not differ
very much from the supposedly more exacting Chapman standard.312
But Brecht is significant as much for its reflection of the Court's changing view of habeas corpus as it is for the Court's changing view of
harmless error analysis. Many have noted and criticized the obvious
trend in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts toward the restriction of
habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions by federal courts.313
308. See 499 U.S. at 292 & n.6 (citing lower federal court cases applying hannless
error analysis to Miranda violations).
309. Compare Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1990 Term - Comment: Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HAR.v. L. REv. 152 (1991) (criticizing the Court's approach) with Meltzer,
supra note 295, at 4 n.15 (confessing to "seeing no reason why a coerced confession
might not be deemed harmless").
310. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
311. See 507 U.S. at 637-38 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776
(1946)). The Court left open the possibility that in "an unusual case" a federal court
might grant habeas relief even if the error or errors were harmless under the Kotteakos
standard. 507 U.S. at 638 n.9.
312. See 507 U.S. at 643 (Stevens, J., concurring) (maintaining that "the way we
phrase the governing standard is far Jess important than the quality of the judgment with
which it is applied"); Edwards, supra note 300, at 1179 (commenting that "if the 1111th
be told, it is hard to discern any material differences in the two standards").
313. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 748 (1987); Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's
Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L. REv. 485 (1995); Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42
HASTINGS LJ. 939 (1991); Frank J. Remington, Restricting Access to Federal Habeas
Corpus: Justice Sacrificed on the Altars of Expediency, Federalism and Deterrence, 16
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 339 (1987-88); Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish for Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 362 (1991); Jordan Steiker, Innocence
and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REv. 303 (1993); Larry W. Yackle, Form and Fune-
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Indeed, one commentator has suggested that habeas corpus · is
"[p]erhaps the area where the Burger Court [has] most dramatically departed from the Warren Court precedents. " 314
It is not my purpose here either to assess the critiques of the Supreme Court's habeas "reforms" or to examine those reforms in great
detail. Rather, I wish briefly to canvass the ways in which the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts have restricted the availability of federal habeas
review, with special attention to review of constitutional issues relating
to police misconduct. Thus, although Stone v. Powell3 15 may not be at
the top of most habeas scholars' list of the most significant departures
from Warren Court precedent, the complete extinction of federal habeas
review of Fourth Amendment violations has obvious import for my argument. By denying federal court review to the class of cases in which
the temptation on behalf of often elected state court judges to tolerate
police misconduct is probably the strongest (because physical evidence,
unlike statements, is such undeniably reliable evidence of guilt), the
post-Warren Courts signalled a willingness to tolerate a necessarily
higher degree of constitutional error at trial than their predecessor
Court. Although the Court declined to extend Stone's complete exemption to the class of Miranda violations, it did so not because it rejected
the "prophylactic" view of Miranda, but almost entirely because it
pragmatically recognized that federal habeas courts still would have to
review the claims of "involuntariness" under the Due Process Clause
that almost invariably accompany defendants' claims that their Miranda
rights were violated.31 6
And while Miranda (and Massiah) claims remain cognizable on
habeas, they are subject to the significant limitations that the Court has
imposed on all habeas litigants. The transformation of the standard for
excusing state procedural defaults from the "deliberate-bypass" standard of Fay v. Noia311 to the "cause-and-prejudice" standard of
Wainwright v. Sykes, 318 the application of the Sykes standard to redefine
the limits on successive petitions under the "abuse-of-the-writ" doction in the Administration of Justice: The Bill of Rights and Federal Habeas Corpus, 23
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 685 (1990).
314. Chemerinsky, supra note 313, at 749. Of course, the work of the Supreme
Court restricting the availability of the writ has in large part been rendered moot by the
recent legislation substantially modifying the federal habeas statute. See Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 735, 110 Stat. 1214,
1217-1220.
315. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
316. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
317. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
318. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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trine, 319 and the limits on the retroactive application of "new law" on
habeas review,320 are some of the most obvious departures from the
Warren Court's understanding of the scope of federal postconviction review. Quite simply, no one can doubt that there has been a "counterrevolution" in habeas corpus from the 1960s to the 1990s.

* * *
It is my hope that my canvassing of the enormous changes in what
I have termed "inclusionary rules" speaks for itself. By promulgating
numerous and wide-ranging exceptions to the exclusionary rules of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, and by limiting the opportunities
for review and reversal of erroneous admissions of constitutionally excludable evidence, the post-Warren Court has "honeycombed" with
holes the scheme that existed at the close of the 1960s for the enforcement at criminal trials of police conduct norms. Whichever enforcement
scheme is better policy or better constitutional interpretation, the two
enforcement regimes bear little resemblance to one another, either in
theory or in practice. In contrast, despite some significant ideological
and theoretical shifts that have occurred between the 1960s and the
1990s, the constitutional police conduct norms of then and now are substantially - even remarkably - similar on the prosaic level of dictating what the police officer on the street is required to do with regard to
searches, seizures, and interrogation of suspects.

IV.

''ACOUSTIC SEPARATION''

This article's primary descriptive claim, elaborated at some length
above, is that there has been a marked difference in the degree of
change between what I variously have termed the Supreme Court's
"conduct" rules and "decision" rules, or "constitutional norms" and
"inclusionary rules," or "rights" and "remedies." This primary claim,
in turn, suggests a second and related descriptive claim, which itself
will require some explication. The second claim, in a nutshell, is that
members of the law enforcement community - the police as a group
- have, not surprisingly, a more accurate and sophisticated understanding of the Supreme Court's ever-changing constitutional adjudication in
the criminal procedure area than does the public at large. In particular,
the police have much greater access to the decision rules promulgated

319. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
320. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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by the Court than does the public, which tends to focus, and to have its
attention focused by the media, on conduct rules.
This second descriptive claim starts from the premise that the Supreme Court's constitutional regulation of police practices under the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments has at least two principal audiences. The police themselves, obviously, are one audience, as it is their
behavior that the Court directly seeks to shape. The general public is
the second audience, because they are "the people" whose rights the
Fourth Amendment safeguards and who never know when they might
become a suspect or even an "accused." These two audiences, however, have different modes of access to Supreme Court jurisprudence
and thus to knowledge of the structure of constitutional rights and remedies. Though I do not claim that there is anything intentional or nefarious about how this has come to be, the .gap between the understandings
of the two audiences is so great that it is as if the Supreme Court speaks
in one voice to one community and in a different voice to the other.
It is here that the elegant and evocative metaphor of "acoustic separation," devised and deployed by Professor Meir Dan-Cohen in a different context, helps to illustrate what I mean. 321 Dan-Cohen used the
distinction between "conduct rules" and "decision rules" in substantive
criminal law to give birth to the idea of "acoustic separation." According to Dan-Cohen, who borrowed the distinction himself from Jeremy
Bentham, conduct rules are addressed to the general public through
criminal prohibitions in order to guide individual behavior (for example,
"Let no person steal").322 On the other hand, decision rules are addressed to the judges who enforce the criminal prohibitions to guide
their decisionmaking about what the consequences of violating such
prohibitions should be (for example, "Let the judge cause whoever is
convicted of stealing to be hanged"). 323 Dan-Cohen observed that in the
context of modern substantive criminal law, conduct rules and decision
rules often diverge dramatically. For example, criminal prohibitions
generally are written in broad and categorical terms. But the defense of
duress also exists to mitigate the harshness of those prohibitions in instances in which leniency seems generally appropriate.324 By separating
the general prohibitions from the defense, the law effects a partial separation between conduct rules and decision rules and thus can achieve
321. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 17, at 630-32.
322. See id. at 626 (quoting BENTHAM, supra note 17, at 430 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)).
323. See id. (quoting BENTHAM, supra note 17, at 430 (emphasis and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
324. Id. at 632-34.

2534

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:2466

both a higher level of compliance with conduct rules and higher degree
of leniency in decision rules than otherwise could coexist if the two
sorts of rules conformed entirely.325 The real world of substantive criminal law thus on occasion approximates an imaginary world in which the
general public (the audience of criminal-conduct rules) and the judges
(the audience of criminal-decision rules) inhabit distinct, acoustically
sealed chambers, unable to hear the rules communicated to each
.other.326 These ideas of "acoustic separation" and "selective transmission" of rules not only describe the way that substantive criminal law
actually works in the real world, argues Dan-Cohen, but they raise interesting questions about the legitimacy and the internal morality of the
law.321
With very little adaptation, Dan-Cohen's metaphor sheds some
light and raises some interesting questions in the criminal procedure
area as well. As I tell my students when we switch from substantive
criminal law to criminal procedure midsemester, the constitutional rules
promulgated under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments are a species of substantive criminal law for the police: they are the conduct
rules that the Supreme Court wants the police to follow just as substantive criminal prohibitions are the conduct rules that the legislature wants
individual citizens to follow. What Dan-Cohen's metaphor helps to
bring to light is the varying degrees of acoustic separation that exist between the Court and the police and between the Court and the public. I
contend, for reasons that I explain below, that the relationship between
the Supreme Court and the police is one of very low acoustic separation. That is, the police are very apt to "hear" the decision rules that
the Supreme Court makes (and that lower federal and state courts apply) and thus to adjust their attitudes about what behavior "really" is
required by the Court's conduct rules.328 In contrast, while members of
the general public have formal access to the Supreme Court's decisions,
they are much more likely to be aware of the Court's conduct rules for
the police than they are to understand the Court's decision rules, for
reasons that I explain below. Hence, there is much greater acoustic separation between the Court and the public than between the Court and
the police - which means that the public and the police "hear" different messages from the same body of law produced by the Court. This
325. See id. at 665.
326. See id. at 630.
327. Id. at 665-77.
328. See id. at 632 (explaining that when a decision rule conflicts with a conduct
rule in the absence of acoustic separation, the decision rule undercuts the power of the
conduct rule).
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situation raises normative questions of its own, which I address in Part

v.

What is the nature of the access that the police have to the decision
rules that the Supreme Court promulgates through constitutional interpretation? Well, one could simply say, "it's their job" to know what the
supreme law of the land commands and forbids them to do and what
the legal consequences of noncompliance are. But there is a bit more to
it than that. The job of most modem American law enforcement agents
brings with it a number of different and overlapping opportunities and
incentives to learn both the conduct rules and the decision rules that are
made by courts. First, police officers are taught by their own departments how to comply with Supreme Court directives and what the consequences of failures to comply will be - whether those consequences
involve the exclusion of evidence, personal civil liability, or internal
discipline. 329 Both federal and state law enforcement agents initially are
trained in "academies" that offer formal instruction on all aspects of
policing, but which generally include instruction in constitutional criminal procedure.330 Also common is on-going internal instruction, which
may include continuing education classes and the periodic dissemination of written material with judicial opinions relating to police work. 331
329. There is also some reason to believe that this information is sometimes conveyed in a fashion that encourages strategic disobedience. See, e.g., Stephen L. Washy,
Police Training About Criminal Procedure: Infrequent and Inadequate, 7 POLY. STUD.
J. 461, 466-67 (1978) (arguing that police department training materials transmit negative attitudes about Supreme Court rulings that encourage officers to seek to evade
them).
330. See National Association of State Directors of Law Enforcement Training
1978 Survey, reproduced in JOHN D. FERRY & MARJORIE KRAVITZ. POLICE TRAINING: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (National Criminal Justice Reference Service of the
U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1980); see also telephone conversations in March 1996 of Hartley
Kuhn, research assistant, with Michael Callahan, Chief Legal Counsel of the Boston Division (explaining that all new agents must attend the EB.I. Training Academy in Quantico, VA, for sixteen weeks during which they receive extensive education about Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment case law), and Lieutenant James Moore of the Boston Police Academy (explaining that all new recruits receive thirty-six hours of training on
constitutional law).
331. In a telephone conversation with Hartley Kuhn, my research assistant, in
March 1996, Michael Callahan, Chief Counsel of the Boston Division of the EB.I., explained that all F.B.I. agents are required to attend an annual legal training session,
which serves to update the agents on all relevant federal constitutional decisions of the
previous year. Mr. Callahan also explained that if a federal court decides a case that is
of immediate importance, he prepares a written analysis of the decision and distributes
it to each agent in his division. In a separate telephone conversation with Ms. Kuhn in
March 1996, Lieutenant James Moore of the Boston Police Academy explained that
when new constitutional law decisions are handed down, Lt. Moore issues Commissioner's Memoranda or conducts new training sessions to inform recruits of changes in
the law. See also Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclu-
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In addition to internal instruction, however, police officers obtain
important infonnation about the trial consequences of violating constitutional prohibitions in their interactions with prosecutors. It is commonplace in the federal system and in some state systems332 for the police to
work in close collaboration with prosecutors in investigating cases in
order to detennine whether and what fonnal charges should be brought.
Prosecutors have both the knowledge (because of their extensive legal
training) and the incentive (because they will often bear primary public
responsibility for the conviction or acquittal that results from such investigations) to ensure that the law enforcement agents working with
them know all of the rules - and all of the loopholes. The possibility
that the sophisticated legal knowledge of prosecutors may lead them to
see how the Supreme Court's decision rules undercut the prohibitions of
the Court's conduct rules is illustrated by the infamous Payner "briefcase caper" case.333 In testimony before the District Court in that case,
it came to light that a Mr. Hyatt, an attorney with the Department of
Justice, explicitly had instructed the I.R.S. agents in the case that the
bank officer whose briefcase was stolen to obtain infonnation against
the defendant would be the only individual to have standing to object to
the blatantly illegal search and that he was not a target of the
investigation.334
Investigations are only one arena in which prosecutor/police contact is likely to give rise to transmission of both conduct and decision
rules. In the sorts of cases most common in state courts - where a police officer makes an arrest and perhaps conducts a search or an interrogation and then presents his or her already completed investigation to
the prosecutor's office - instruction on both the validity of the search
and seizure itself and on the admissibility of the evidence obtained at
trial is forthcoming in the prosecutor's decision to charge or to decline
to charge the defendant. Whether or not the prosecutor takes the opporsionary Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 751,
851-52.
332. The Fifth Amendment requirement of indictment by grand jury for felony
cases has not been incorporated through the Due Process Clause to apply to the states.
Nonetheless, nearly half of the states require grand jury indictments as a matter of state
law, and those that do not require such indictments still give the prosecutor the option
of empaneling a grand jury. And even in those states that do not generally use grand juries, judges nonetheless review charging decisions at preliminary hearings, at which investigating police officers are likely to testify. See Jerold H. Israel, Grand Jury, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 810, 815-16 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
333. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); supra text accompanying
notes 211-13.
334. See United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 131 & n.69 (N.D. Ohio 1977),
affd., 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979), revd., 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
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tunity to formally instruct the arresting and investigating officers on the
relationship between the conduct of the investigation and the decision to
charge, which no doubt varies across individual prosecutors and individual situations, the officers likely learn something about investigative
techniques and their effect on trial outcomes simply from the prosecutor's charging decision alone.
Moreover, in those cases in which charges are filed and in which
motions to suppress evidence on constitutional grounds are litigated, police officers generally are "prepared" to testify by the prosecutor litigating the case. The officer already may have testified before the grand
jury in the federal system or a state system that indicts by grand jury
and also may testify again at the trial itself. These one-on-one sessions
with the prosecutor are very likely to transmit both conduct norms
(what behavior would be constitutional under the circumstances) and
decision rules (what the likely outcome of the officer's testimony will
be for trial). Whether or not the prosecutor clearly transmits this information, written opinions by judges granting or denying motions to suppress no doubt do so, and it seems extremely likely that police officers
read opinions on the propriety and consequences of their own conduct
with a great deal more attention and interest than most other sources of
information regarding constitutional adjudication.335
In contrast, members of the public at large have much less access
to the decision rules promulgated by courts than they have to the conduct rules imposed on police officers. These conduct rules, after all, are
couched not in terms of commands to police officers but in terms of
"rights" of individuals; and these "rights" do not require a great deal
of legal sophistication to understand. The requirement that the police
have either a judge's permission or some good reason (a warrant or
probable cause) in order to make an arrest or conduct a search is not an
arcane concept, nor is the requirement of warnings prior to interrogation
or the requirement that counsel be provided once a crime is charged.
Popular culture, particularly through television and movies, has pro-

335. In one of the few detailed surveys of police knowledge of constitutional
criminal procedure, the vast majority of those officers surveyed reported that having
their own evidence suppressed or seeing a fellow officer's evidence suppressed was the
most significant way in which they learned about changes in the law of search and
seizure. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence:
An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016, 1036
(1987); see also RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS:
PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 88 (1985) (receiving similar responses
from police officers interviewed in a number of different cities).
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vided a constant stream of "police dramas" since the 1950s,336 and
these dramas have widely disseminated some of the basic norms, constitutional and otherwise, of police conduct. Popular dramatizations of
police work, however, generally are not able to and do not try to get
into the details of decision rules. The distinction between the use of evidence in the "case-in-chief" and its use as "impeachment," the changing meaning of "standing" to challenge unconstitutional police conduct,
or the varying standards for the review of "harmless error" on appeal
require too much knowledge of arcane jargon and a too sophisticated
understanding of the legal process to make good drama that is widely
accessible.
Moreover, reports by the media run into much the same problem.
Because judicial opinions dealing with decision rules often will take
more time or space (depending on the medium) to explain,337 and because journalists themselves often may riot understand them,338 such decisions may get reported less frequently and less accurately than decisions relating to conduct rules, which are easier both to understand and
to convey. The problems attendant in reporting on complicated constitutional cases in general is exacerbated in reporting on the decisions of
the Supreme Court. The Court's general opinion-writing style339 and its
336. Television, for example, has moved from Dragnet (NBC television broadcast
1951-59) to The Untouchables (ABC television broadcast, 1959-63) to The Mod Squad
(ABC television broadcast, 1968-73) to Starsky and Hutch (ABC television broadcast,
1975-79) to Hill Street Blues (NBC television broadcast, 1981-87) to Law & Order
(NBC television broadcast, 1990-present) and NYPD Blue (ABC television broadcast,
1993-present). First-year law students, who almost uniformly can recite the full text of
the Miranda warnings prior to reading the case, generally credit their knowledge to the
T.V. police drama, Hawaii Five-0 (CBS television broadcast, 1968-80). See generally
David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court 1V, Conventional Television, and
Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35 Aruz. L. REv. 785, 786
(1993) (explaining how "popular culture virtually creates the picture people have of
criminal justice"); Steven D. Stark, Perry Mason Meets Sonny Crockett: The History of
Lawyers and the Police as Television Heroes, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 229, 230 (1987)
(arguing that television crime dramas have shaped "the public's perceptions of lawyers,
the police, and the legal system").
337. Linda Greenhouse, who has covered the Supreme Court for the New York
Times for many years, recently has noted that "space is tight in newspapers and getting
tighter all the time." Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court's Story: Justice and Journalism at the Supreme Court, 105 YALE LJ. 1537, 1550 (1996).
338. The reporting on the Supreme Court's habeas corpus cases and on the legislative proposals, eventually successful, for habeas "reform" provides many good examples of how journalists themselves often fail to understand the complexities of constitutional criminal procedure.
339. Many have criticized the obscurity of most Supreme Court opinions. See,
e.g., RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRESS 8 (1994) (arguing that the Court deliberately remains aloof and mysterious in order to maintain "public deference and compliance"); Ray Forrester, Supreme Court
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lack of communication with and solicitude for the media340 add to the
difficulty that already inheres in attempting to transmit the substance of
the more obscure of the Court's opinions to the public at large. The extent to which press coverage of the Supreme Court, which often mentions the names of the Justices in conjunction with their opinions, fails
to make much of an impression on the public consciousness was distressingly revealed by a Washington Post poll that indicated that a much
larger percentage of 1200 randomly selected adults (59%) could name
all three of the Three Stooges than could name a single Supreme Court
Justice (44%).341
Of course, some members of the public get information about the
criminal justice process not only through popular culture or the media
but directly as victims, witnesses, and defendants in criminal trials.
These experiences, however, unlike those of police officers, are not
likely to lead to a sophisticated understanding of decision rules. First of
all, the vast majority of criminal cases are plea-bargained and never
reach trial, so most victims of and witnesses to crimes never appear in
court. Second, suppression hearings, from which police officers reported learning so much about the workings of constitutional criminal
procedure, are not proceedings at which either victims or civilian witnesses generally testify, for the obvious reason that they are rarely present during or able to offer relevant testimony about police searches,
seizures, and interrogations. Finally, victims, witnesses, and defendants
are rarely (with the exception of a class of recidivist offenders) repeat
players in the criminal justice system and therefore are unlikely to learn
about it from the inside the way that police officers inevitably do.342
Thus, it seems inevitable that there will be much greater "acoustic
separation" - that is, "selective transmission" of decision rules and
conduct rules - between the Supreme Court (and courts in general)
Opinions - Style and Substance: An Appeal for Reform, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 173
(1995) (making concrete suggestions for simplification of Supreme Court opinions in
light of the fact that most are currently "incomprehensible to the general public").
340. See Greenhouse, supra note 337, at 1558 (describing the "substantial obstacles to conveying the work of the Court accurately to the public," such as the Court's
habit of issuing a large number of important opinions at the same time at the end of the
Term and the impediments to obtaining transcripts of oral arguments in a timely
fashion).
341. Id. at 1539 (citing Richard Morin, Unconventional Wisdom, WASH. POST,
Oct 8, 1995, at CS). Lest readers get distracted from my argument here, the Three
Stooges are Larry, Moe, and Curly.
342. Cf. Cheryl Russell, True Crime, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS, Aug. 1995, at
22, 24 (citing a 1994 L.A. Times poll revealing that most Americans who responded reported that their feelings about crime were based on what they read or saw in the media
rather than on what they personally experienced).
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and the general public than can plausibly exist between the courts and
the police. If this second descriptive claim is true in addition to the first
claim about the nature of the Court's "counter-revolution" in criminal
procedure, it tends to suggest that the police have a much more nuanced
and sophisticated - and less constrained - view of what conduct is
likely to lead to judicial penalty than does the public at large. Should
this divergence - this "acoustic separation" between the police and
the public - be a cause for concern?
V.

CONCLUSION: CONCERNS?

Before addressing the concerns raised by the "acoustic separation"
that I have identified, it seems necessary to ask why the Supreme Court
has established a pattern of change in constitutional criminal procedure
that has created such separation. After all, if the relative constancy of
conduct rules and the relative explosion of decision rules are just the
products of random happenstance, then the "pattern" created could
change at any time and we need not worry about its necessarily temporary effects. I do not believe that the pattern that I have identified is a
random one. First, the pattern has been too consistent over a period of
too many years. Second, the pattern has been too unexpected and
counterintuitive. Almost all the legal pundits expected the Warren
Court's innovations in constitutional criminal procedure to be abandoned by the post-Warren Court; indeed, this is just what President
Nixon promised that his appointees would do. And yet the Warren
Court's conduct rules - the most visible symbols of its "revolution"
- remained intact in the era of expected "counter-revolution."
The most obvious possible answer to the "why" question is a purposive one: the Supreme Court radically altered decision rules while
keeping conduct rules intact because the Court understood and intended
the consequences of "acoustic separation" that I have identified. According to such a purposive account, the Court affirmatively sought the
opportunity to speak sotto voce to the police without the public overhearing. Perhaps the Court thought that open elimination of constitutional protections would convey to the general public the appearance of
permitting the police to "run[] roughshod over the personal liberties of
members of the American community" and thus retained "symbolic
gestures" in its doctrine to avoid that appearance.343 Or perhaps the
343. JOHN F. DECKER, REVOLUTION TO THE RIGHT: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
JURISPRUDENCE DURING THE BURGER-REHNQUIST COURT ERA 7 (1992). Professor
Decker comes the closest to making this purposive argument, albeit without explicit reference to the idea of "acoustic separation."
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Court realized that defendants convicted of crimes and punished need to
be convinced of the legitimacy of their punishment in order to prevent a
downward spiral of violence and repression,344 and in order to promote
such a belief, the Court consciously retained conduct rules as symbols
of solicitude for the rights of criminal defendants, while simultaneously
freeing the police from the consequences of violating these rights by altering decision rules.
Although this purposive theory is perhaps implicit in the parallel I
seek to draw to Professor Dan-Cohen's own argument about "acoustic
separation," it is not one that I necessarily endorse. I say "perhaps implicit" because Dan-Cohen refers to the effect of acoustic separation in
substantive criminal law as a "strateg[y]" or "technique[]" that legal
systems "avail themselves of " 345 as a form of "bluffing. " 346 One might
think, then, that I mean to contend that the Supreme Court's pattern of
changing decision rules while maintaining conduct rules is similarly a
strategy to achieve the "selective transmission" of information about
the consequences of unlawful conduct by law enforcement agents. Although it is not impossible that the effect of acoustic separation was noticed and perhaps even intended by individual Justices in individual
cases, I see no evidence for and, indeed, find implausible the claim that
consciousness of this effect was the primary motivating force driving
the several-decade-long pattern in the Court's decisionmaking in constitutional criminal procedure. It seems unlikely that any Justice would
openly advocate, even in the relative privacy of the Court's conference
room, the use of acoustic separation as a strategy for "bluffing" the
public while essentially winking at the police. Even couched in less pejorative terms, no description of the use of acoustic separation as a tool
of "selective transmission" fits very well with any of the Justices' publicly articulated conception of his or her judicial role. And without such
open discussion of the possible desirability of the effect of acoustic separation, it seems unlikely that a belief in such desirability could have
played a large role in motivating the ever-shifting majorities that are responsible for the long-term pattern that I have identified.
A more satisfying answer to the "why" question seems to lie in a
more modest or "weak" purposive account. Under the "strong" purposive account, a Court hostile to the Warren Court's innovations in con344. See Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian
Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315 (1984) (arguing that criminal defendants need to be convinced of the legitimacy of their punishment in order to
prevent massive social disorder and a downward spiral of violence and repression).
345. Dan-Cohen, supra note 17, at 635.
346. Id. at 677.
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straining police power realizes that it can substantially lift those constraints by changing decisions rules while simultaneously misleading
the public in general (and criminal defendants in particular) about the
extent of the changes. A weaker purposive account acknowledges the
post-Warren Court's hostility to the criminal procedure decisions of the
Warren Court,347 but portrays the Court as constrained either by its own
view of its appropriate judicial role, or by sheer pragmatism, from moving too quickly or too decisively to overturn those decisions. Under this
account, the Court chooses to modify decision rules rather than conduct
rules not because it knows that by doing so it can communicate "selectively" with the police and the public, but rather because changes in decision rules, perhaps because of their lack of visibility to the public, feel
less dramatic and "political" than, say, overturning Miranda outright.
An appeal to judicial moderation and restraint, couched in terms of
stare decisis, or a more pragmatic concern about public perceptions of
the Court's separation from the world of politics, are likely the kinds of
arguments that would arise in conference room discussion. 348
There is much more to be said about the "why" of Supreme Court
decisionmaking - from analyses of the perspectives and influences of
individual Justices349 to characterizations of the ideology of different
Courts over time350 to explorations of the particular negotiations and

347. This is where the literature on ideological change between the Warren and
post-Warren Courts is particularly helpful. For example, Peter Arenella's reconstruction
of Herbert Packer's two "models" of the criminal justice system to explain the different
ideological commitments of the Warren and Burger Courts presents a nuanced view of
how different conceptions of the nature and purpose of criminal justice play out in particular doctrinal arenas. See Arenella, supra note 5, at 209-47 (citing HERBERT L.
PACKER. THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968)).
348. This account of why the Court changed decision rules rather than conduct
rules also explains why Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) - the Court's most notorious decision-rule case - survived in the post-Warren Court era. According to my
model of change in decision rules and constancy in conduct rules, Mapp should have
been overruled. But if the reason for the change in decision rules and the constancy in
conduct rules was the relative invisibility and the incremental and nonpolitical "feel" of
decision rules as compared to conduct rules, it becomes easy to see why Mapp was an
exception. Given the degree of controversy that Mapp generated in the political arena,
overruling Mapp would have been highly visible and would have opened up the Court
to exactly the charge of engaging in "politics" that it sought to avoid.
349. See, e.g., THE wARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND PoLmCAL PERSPECTIVE (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993) (offering individual chapters on Warren, Frankfurter,
Douglas, Black, Harlan, Brennan, White, and Fortas).
350. See, e.g., Arenella, supra note 5 (comparing and contrasting the ideologies of
the Warren and Burger Courts); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970) (characterizing and criticizing the Warren Court's conception of its judicial role); Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the
Burger Court, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1436 (1987) (same for the Burger Court).
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compromises that comprise the Court's day-to-day politics.351 These issues are not my primary focus here, and I do not pretend that my account of why the pattern that I have identified has appeared is either
complete or even completely right as far as it goes. Rather, my analysis
is important for only two fairly modest points - one a claim and one a
disclaimer. The claim is that the pattern that I have identified is not random (like the pattern of tea leaves at the bottom of a cup); rather, it is
the product of some purposeful action on behalf of the Court's shifting
majorities over a long period of time. The "weak" purposive account
that I have sketched seems to me the most persuasive explanation for
this consistent action, but there are no doubt other theories that could
plausibly supplement or supplant the account that I offer. The important
claim, however, is merely that the pattern is too unusual to have been
achieved and maintained for long in a random fashion. The disclaimer
is that nothing about the concerns that I raise below depends on the
"strong" purposive account being true. That is, whether or not any
member of the Court ever observed or intended the effect of acoustic
separation, we still ought to worry about the implications of acoustic
separation that I identify, as long as those implications are the byproduct of some other consistent set of choices made by the Court.
There are at least two significant implications of acoustic separation that ought to concern us. Each implication relates to one of the two
principal audiences of the Court's constitutional criminal procedure the police and the public. As for the police, the implication of acoustic
separation that ought to concern us is the likelihood that, in conditions
of low acoustic separation, decision rules will, in effect, become conduct rules. Where the police "hear" the Court's decision rules and thus
are able to predict the likely legal consequences of their unconstitutional behavior, they may see little reason to continue to obey conduct
rules that are consistently unenforced in criminal prosecutions. If the
consequences imposed by the Court's decision rules play a significant
role in motivating compliance with conduct rules, then changes in decision rules will necessarily change compliance with conduct rules.
Of course, there are other reasons that police officers might obey
constitutional conduct rules, regardless of constitutional decision rules.
They might fear civil or even criminal liability, departmental discipline,
or independent administrative sanctions, such as those imposed by citizen complaint review boards. Or they might simply wish to obey the
law as interpreted by the courts regardless of what the sanctions might
351. See, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE
INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT (1995).
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be.352 Thus, changes in the Court's decision rules will not influence the
behavior of all police officers in all situations. Nonetheless, there is
much good reason to think that the Supreme Court's constitutional decision rules do play an important role in motivating compliance with the
law, even relative to other potential sanctions.
First, the other potential sanctions for unconstitutional police conduct have been notoriously ineffective in deterring such misconduct. Indeed, the Supreme Court offered the ineffectiveness of alternative remedies as a primary reason for adopting its most controversial decision
rule - the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. The Mapp Court
noted that, as of 1961, it was apparent that remedies other than evidentiary exclusion for unconstitutional police conduct had proved "worthless and futile." 353 And since Mapp was decided, there has been "overwhelming consensus" among those who have studied the problem that
alternative remedies remain "sadly inadequate." 354 Thus, there seems
little reason to believe that police officers who, through low acoustic
separation, realize that there will be no sanction within the criminal process for violating constitutional rights, will nonetheless refrain from
such violations as a result of such alternative sanctions.
Second, while there may be some police officers who will attempt
to obey the law as they understand it, regardless of any sanction that
may be imposed,355 there are no doubt other officers who will purposefully violate the law in the absence of sanctions, usually because they
believe they can achieve law enforcement objectives by doing so. Indeed, the same study that indicated the existence of officers who had
"unequivocal respect for the law" also indicated that those officers with
352. See William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance With the Law, 24 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 311, 351 (1991) (identifying a substantial group of officers in an empirical study who demonstrated "unequivocal respect for the law" in their answers to
hypothetical questions "by never indicating that they would intrude in a setting where
they believed it illegal to do so").
353. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961).
354. Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 562 & n.82 (1990) (citing, in
chronological order, William Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 621; Project, Suing the Police in
Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781 (1979); William A. Schroeder, Deterring Fourth
Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361
(1981); Pierre J. Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations and
Damage Remedies, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875, 907-13 (1982); Daniel J.
Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs
and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 247, 284-86
(1988)).
355. See supra note 352.
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only "equivocal" respect for the law became more willing to deliberately violate the law with more training.356 Although the study did not
offer any reason for this correlation between increases in the knowing
violation rate and increases in police officer training, one explanation
might be that more training reveals the gaps between conduct rules and
decision rules and thus permits "equivocal" police officers to exploit
such gaps by recognizing which violations will not lead to sanctions
within the criminal justice system.
Indeed, one study of police attitudes regarding the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule revealed that police officers generally did not regard conduct rules as binding unless they were enforced by decision
rules. In a study based on interviews of a variety of police officers and
commanders, Professor Milton Loewenthal found that "most police officers interpret the Wolf case [which declined to extend the federal
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states in 1949] as not having imposed any legal obligation on the police since, under that decision, the evidence would still be admissible no matter how it was obtained. "357 He found that there was "strong evidence" that "regardless
of the effectiveness of direct sanctions, police officers could neither understand nor respect a Court which purported to impose constitutional
standards on the police without excluding evidence obtained in violation of those standards." 358 Loewenthal's findings, which he used to oppose replacement of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule with alternative remedies, also support my claim that we should worry about
the increasing gap between conduct rules and decision rules in constitutional criminal procedure generally, because such a gap will lead at
least some police officers to view the decision rules, not the conduct
rules, as the "real" law.
This fear is illustrated by cases such as Payner in which federal
law enforcement agents deliberately exploited Payner's lack of standing
to object to their blatantly illegal behavior in the "briefcase caper"
case.359 A more recent example can be found in Simpson v. United
States, 360 in which a homicide detective questioned a defendant charged
with the murder of his two disabled children. The defendant had
stabbed his sons to death and then attempted to kill himself while in a

356. See Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 352, at 367.
357. Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REv. 24, 29 (1980) (discussing police officers' reaction to Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)).
358. Id.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 211-12.
360. 632 A.2d 374 (D.C. 1993).
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desperate emotional state. Although the defendant had been indicted
and appointed counsel, the detective nonetheless interviewed him at the
hospital where he was being treated for his serious wounds and obtained an oral statement without counsel present and without any waiver
of the right to counsel, in clear violation of the Massiah rule. 361 At a
hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress his statement, the detective testified, with surprising frankness, that he knew that the defendant
was represented by counsel and that he knew that any statements obtained through interrogation were inadmissible at trial, but that he also
knew that under prevailing law in the District of Columbia such statements would be admissible to impeach the defendant should he testify
at trial.362 The motions court reacted to this testimony as follows:
I guess I'm worried here because Detective Schwartz could have been
going through the following mental processes and, if not he himself, any
other police officer in any other case at any time: "I know I'm not going
to be permitted to talk to this defendant. He's got a lawyer. I'm going to
do it anyway, and maybe I can get a confession or admission out of him;
and maybe we can't use it, but man, oh man, we'll sure have him locked
in if he gets on the stand and starts to lie like a rug. So I'm going to do it
anyway, even though I know it's contrary to the rules, to the
Constitution. " 363

These concerns by the motions court are exactly those that arise whenever there is significant divergence between conduct rules and decision
rules in constitutional criminal procedure.
Payner and Simpson are good illustrations of the consequences of
low acoustic separation when police officers view the Court's constitutional criminal procedure through the lens of Holmes's famous "bad
man" who "cares only for the material consequences which such
knowledge [of the law] enables him to predict." 364 Such consequences
are prevalent enough that two scholars have penned satirical versions of
361. 632 A.2d at 381-82.
362. 632 A.2d at 378. The D.C. Court of Appeals previously had held that statements obtained in violation of Massiah could be used to impeach the defendant's testimony. See Martinez v. United States, 566 A.2d 1049 (D.C. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1030 (1991). This issue has been only partially resolved by the Supreme Court. See
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990) (holding that statements obtained in violation
of Michigan v. Jackson, 415 U.S. 625 (1986), may be used for impeachment purposes,
but leaving open the question whether other Massiah violations may be so used); supra
text accompanying notes 287-92 (discussing Harvey and its implications).
363. Simpson, 632 A.2d at 382 n.16.
364. See Holmes, supra note 15, at 459. This is not to suggest that police officers
are generally "bad men" (or women) in a pejorative sense. No doubt many officers
who choose to exploit the gaps between conduct rules and decision rules do so for what
they see as moral reasons - the belief the greater good is served by such crimefighting techniques. Holmes's "bad man" is simply a construct of legal positivism that
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police training manuals authored by and for the Holmesian "bad man."
Professor Albert Alschuler suggests that advice to police about the
Miranda requirements could take, in part, the following form:
Upon arresting a suspect, do not give him the Miranda
warnings. . . .
After an hour or two (during which your suspect will have provided
either a statement or a potentially useful period of silence), you should
advise him of his rights. If the suspect waives these rights, his statement
will be admissible. If he indicates that he wishes to remain silent or to
consult a lawyer, however, continue to interrogate him without a lawyer.
Although the prosecutor will be unable to introduce as part of the state's
case-in-chief any statement that the suspect makes, the suspect's statement will become admissible to impeach his testimony if he later takes
the witness stand to say something different from what he told you. . . .
Do not place too much pressure on the suspect, however. If a court holds
his confession involuntary under pre-Miranda standards, it will be inadmissible for any purpose. The Supreme Court has said that pre-Miranda
voluntariness standards are part of the "real" Constitution. Miranda is
part of the Court's "just pretend" Constitution.365

Professor Craig Bradley has added further advice regarding the Fourth
Amendment to Alschuler's hypothetical officer, including the following:
If you have no prospect of obtaining probable cause, go ahead and search
anyway. If you don't find anything, there's no evidence to suppress....
If you do find something, the evidence can be used to impeach, and
that's better than nothing.366

It is true that standing and impeachment are areas where the gaps between conduct rules and decision rules create clear and obvious incentives for the Holmesian police officer to violate the Constitution.367
Some other changes in decision rules that I have identified translate less
directly into incentives for law enforcement agents. Most particularly,

seeks to define law by reference to the sanctions that follow from it, as becomes evident
when he is quoted in full context:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct,
whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
Id.
365. Alschuler, supra note 350, at 1442-43 (footnotes omitted).
366. CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
REVOLUTION 54 (1993). Bradley's advice includes ways of exploiting the limits of
conduct rules as well as the gaps between conduct and decision rules.
367. I have noted above how other decision rules also create clear incentives for
police misconduct. See supra text accompanying notes 218-58 (discussing incentives
created by the "good-faith" exception to the warrant requirement, the "independentsource" doctrine, and the "fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree" doctrine).
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changes in standards of review on appeal and cutbacks on postconviction remedies are hard to convert into "advice" for the Holmesian officer. These decisions create only general and atmospheric incentives for unlawful conduct; the hypothetical advice manual might read:
Even if you violate the Constitution and decision rules call for an exclusionary sanction, the trial court might decide to admit the evidence anyway, given how unpopular it is to suppress reliable evidence of criminal
wrongdoing and how unlikely it is that such a decision will be reversed
on appeal, given the rules about harmless error. And if the appellate court
does not reverse, it is very unlikely that a federal habeas court will even
hear the case, much less grant relief.

Thus, the shift in the decision rules regarding the review and reversal of
convictions, though they may not have created direct incentives for police misconduct, nonetheless may play a symbolic role by reinforcing
the impression that the courts are seeking to loosen constitutional constraints on police investigative practices.
Of course, if one thinks that the constitutional conduct rules that
currently exist are too restrictive and that they should be loosened, one
probably would not object to the fact that changes in decision rules are
likely to result in changes in conduct rules. One would likely view the
changing of decision rules as an indirect but nonetheless effective way
of achieving an important goal - the readjustment of the baseline of
constitutionally acceptable police behavior. But even if one believes that
conduct rules should be readjusted, there remains an independent objection to effecting such change through decision rules - a concern about
public misperception of the nature and scope of constitutional constraints on police behavior.
The public is the second principal audience of the Court's constitutional procedure. The Court's definitions of the constitutional scope of
the power to search, seize, and interrogate individuals speak directly to
the police by establishing limits on police investigative power, but they
also speak directly to the public by establishing the contours of individual rights. Given the much higher degree of acoustic separation that exists between the public and the courts than exists between the police
and the courts, however, the public is likely to believe that the Court's
conduct rules are more inviolable than they really are; the public is
likely to be fooled or, in Dan-Cohen's language, "bluffed" into thinking that the conduct rules are the "real" law, not the conduct rules as
modified by the decision rules that only the police can hear. 368
368. In essence, my claim here is that acoustic separation serves to "legitimate"
the exercise of police power in the United States in the sense of "inducing a false or
exaggerated belief in the normative justifiability of something in the social world -
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Available evidence is consistent with this "bluffing" hypothesis.
For example, the public routinely indicates that it believes that the police are over-constrained by the constitutional conduct rules imposed by
the courts.369 Moreover, public opinion polls also indicate that the public has enormous faith in law enforcement as an institution370 and relatively little fear of police over-reaching.371 Of course, these public estimations of the constraints on police behavior, the trustworthiness of the
police as an institution, and the threat to civil liberties from police overreaching could all be completely accurate; there is no "objective" way
to evaluate the accuracy of this opinion data as fact. But the existence
of acoustic separation between the public and the courts should make us
see these extremely sanguine views of law enforcement as perhaps
overly sanguine. We should worry that these views reflect a misguided
belief that the Supreme Court regulates - indeed, over-regulates - police conduct to such a degree that we have little to fear from out-ofcontrol officers and much more to fear from overly constrained officers,
when police-conduct rules are in fact undercut by more invisible decision-rules.372

that is, of inducing belief in the absence of or in contradiction to evidence of what the
phenomenon is 'really' like." Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HAR.v. L. REv. 355, 429-30 (1995) (exploring the "legitimation" effects of
the Supreme Court's regulation of capital punishment).
369. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne Jr., A.C.L.U. Studies Its Image and Finds It Intact, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 14, 1989, § 1, at 23 (reporting that 78% of those polled by the American
Civil Liberties Union agreed with the statement, "Protecting the constitutional rights of
criminals makes law enforcement more difficult," and that 62% thought that the countty had "gone too far in protecting the rights of persons accused of committing
crimes").
370. In Gallup polls conducted in 1993, 1994, and 1995, more than 50% of those
polled reported "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the police - more than
any other institution except the military and as much as "Church or organized religion." See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 1994, at 145 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1995).
371. A 1994 Gallup poll indicated that only 26% of those polled viewed "police
over-reaction to crime" as a "very serious threat" to "Americans' rights and freedoms" as compared to 83% for "crime," 41 % for "government regulations," and 47%
for "lack of econoinic opportunity." Only "Inilitary threat from a foreign countty" was
viewed as less threatening, and not by much (23%). Id. at 144.
372. Indeed, a perverse effect of "acoustic separation" is that criminals, too, may
overestimate the degree to which the police are constrained in investigating crime and
thus underestimate the likelihood of arrest and conviction, resulting in under-deterrence
of criminal activity. As a public defender, I represented more than one defendant who
was convinced that the failure of the police to advise him of his Miranda warnings precluded not only the admissibility of any statements, but also the initiation of criminal
proceedings altogether.
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This skewing of public opinion regarding the constraints on police
behavior should worry us because of its implications for the policy
choices made by popularly elected branches of government. A parallel
concern was reflected by the "truth-in-sentencing" movement, which
sought to bring into liI).e the criminal sentences announced by judges
and the amount of time convicted criminals actually served because the
granting of parole often led the latter to be much shorter than the former. Of course, the judges imposing sentence knew that their sentences
would not actually be served in full, and they generally knew how the
parole system worked and thus what their sentences "really" meant.
But the public, who saw the sentences imposed in the courtroom or
learned about them from the media, was mislead into thinking that the
announced sentence was the "real" sentence. "Truth-in-sentencing" reform was a way to close the gap between public perception and reality
and thus to lead to better public policy by the popularly elected
branches who generally set the penalties for particular crimes.
There is good reason to fear that the public's over-estimation of
the constraints on law enforcement induced by acoustic separation cur~
rently skews public policy. It seems to have become a distinctively
American trait to see the police and the criminal justice process as the
first line of defense against social decay. Recent transnational studies
have revealed that the United States has one of the highest, if not the
highest, incarceration rate in the world. 373 At a time when libertarian
sentiment rejecting "big government" is in vogue, there is nonetheless
strong bi-partisan support for increasing the amount of money invested
in police officers and prisons.374 Of course, many social and cultural
factors play a role in determining public policy. But we should worry
373. One study, reported in 1991, placed the United States first in the world. See
Sharon LaFraniere, U.S. Has Most Prisoners Per Capita in the World, WASH. POST,
Jan. 5, 1991, at A3 (reporting study placing South Africa second and the former Soviet
Union third in per capita incarceration rates). Another study, reported in 1994, placed
the United States second, after Russia. See Steven A. Holmes, Ranks of Inmates Reach
One Million in a 2-Decade Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1994, at Al (reporting study indicating that the United States' rate of incarceration is more than four times that of Canada, more than five times that of England and Wales, and fourteen times that of Japan). Russell Balcer recently has satirized this tendency toward increased incarceration
in a column aptly titled, "Hooked on Jail." Russell Balcer, Hooked on Jail (Whatever
the Problem, the Solution is Jail), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1995, at A25.
374. Sociologist Mark Warr observes:
Americans have long believed that too little money is spent to control crime ....
Such sentiment may explain the enormous levels of public spending on crime
control in the United States in recent years, including massive prison construction
programs in states like Texas and California, and the sorts of measures (e.g., one
hundred thousand new police officers) envisioned in President Clinton's recent
crime bill.
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about the impact of the public's misperceptions about constitutional
constraints on law enforcement. Professor Michael Seidman made exactly this point in his contribution to a symposium on "Constitutional
Stupidities":
Although [criminal procedure protections] do little to make the prosecutor's job harder, people commonly believe that they obstruct the prosecution of dangerous criminals. Some doubt and ambivalence that might otherwise accompany the use of violent and coercive sanctions is thereby
dissipated.375

"Doubt and ambivalence" about the use of policing and imprisonment
as our primary means of dealing with everything from drug addiction to
"deadbeat dads" who fail to pay child support might well be appropriate. But acoustic separation may prevent people from hearing messages
that might sow the seeds of doubt.
Much has been written about the symbolic importance of constitutional procedural protections for criminal defendants, whether or not
such protections actually perform any other useful function, such as deterring unlawful police conduct. The most dramatic exposition of this
point is Anthony Amsterdam's:
I do not mean to suggest that Supreme Court decisions respecting suspects' and defendants' rights are unimportant. Like the Pythia's cries,
they have vast mystical significance. They state our aspirations. They
give a few good priests something to work with. They give some of the
faithful the courage to carry on and reason to improve the priesthood instead of tearing down the temple.376

But this point, while important, has a dark underside. The existence of
acoustic separation prevents the public from knowing what the police
know - that the Supreme Court's conduct rules "symbolize" a commitment that is seriously undermined by the Court's decision rules. To
use Amsterdam's evocative metaphor, when the Court's constitutional
criminal protections appear to be more protective of individual liberties
than they really are, the "faithful" (the public) are led to blind adherence to a "priesthood" (the police) that may not be able to offer the
miracle cures that all pious pilgrims seek.

Mark Warr, Poll Trends: Public Opinion on Crime and Punishment, 59 PuB. OPINION
Q. 296, 300 (1995).
375. Louis Michael Seidman, Criminal Procedure as the Servant of Politics, 12
CONST. COMMENTARY 207, 210 (1995).
376. Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in
Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 785, 793 (1970); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 435, 460 (1987) ("For those concerned
only with the 'bottom line,' Miranda may seem a mere symbol. But the symbolic effects of criminal procedural guarantees are important; they underscore our societal commitment to restraint in an area in which emotions easily run uncontrolled.").

